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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

KILLING WOTUS 2015: WHY THREE RULEMAKINGS MAY NOT
BE ENOUGH
STEPHEN M. JOHNSON*
The rules adopted by federal administrative agencies are influenced
substantially by the politics of the President. Presidential control of agencies is
an important factor that has motivated courts to defer to agencies when they
review agencies’ interpretations of statutes. 1 After all, the President, the head of
the Executive Branch, is directly accountable to the American people through
elections, whereas judges are not accountable. 2 So, when Presidents change, the
rules and policies of agencies often change. 3 Recognizing the important role of
the President in influencing agencies’ policies, former Supreme Court Chief
Justice William Rehnquist counseled in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., “A change in
administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly

* Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School. B.S., J.D. Villanova University, LL.M. George
Washington University School of Law.
1. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984). See also, Fla.
Manufactured Hous. Ass’n v. Cisneros, 53 F.3d 1565, 1577 (11th Cir. 1995); Ransom v. Bowen,
844 F.2d 1326, 1335 (7th Cir. 1988). For a seminal article discussing the Constitutional and policy
justifications for strong Presidential control over agency decision-making, see Harold H. Bruff,
Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 450, 451 (1979). Many other
academics have focused on the appropriate scope of Presidential control over agency decisionmaking. See Stephen M. Johnson, Disclosing the President’s Role in Rulemaking: A Critique of the
Reform Proposals, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2011) [hereinafter, Johnson, Disclosing the
President’s Role in Rulemaking]; Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or The Decider? The President in
Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 750–51 (2007); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s
Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006); Elena Kagan,
Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2372 (2001); Steven G. Calabresi &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 544–45,
636 (1994); Lawrence Lessig & Cass Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 1, 6 (1994).
2. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
3. See Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN.
L. 285, 289 (2013); Ari Cuenin, Mooting the Night Away: Postinauguration Midnight-Rule
Changes and Vacatur for Mootness, 60 Duke L.J. 453, 476–77 (2010); Jack M. Beermann,
Combating Midnight Regulation, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 352, 360 (2009); Jason M. Loring & Liam
R. Roth, After Midnight: The Durability of the “Midnight” Regulations Passed by the Two Previous
Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1444 (2005).
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reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of the costs and benefits
of its programs and regulations.” 4
However, agencies are not merely the President’s political playthings.
Justice Rehnquist conditioned his support for politically-based policy changes
in State Farm by stressing that “a new administration may not refuse to enforce
laws of which it does not approve, or to ignore statutory standards in carrying
out its regulatory functions.” 5 In addition, while the Supreme Court has
identified the political accountability of the President as one reason for deferring
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, the other primary reasons that courts
defer to agencies’ interpretations of statutes are because agencies have expertise
in the subject matter of the statutes and Congress intended agencies to exercise
that expertise to interpret and administer statutes. 6 While Congress occasionally
enacts legislation that delegates rulemaking or decision-making power directly
to the President, 7 most statutes delegate such authority to administrative
agencies, presumably because Congress wants agencies to exercise their
expertise in the subject matter, rather than making decisions based on politics. 8
Basic principles of administrative law limit the President’s ability to change
rules for purely political reasons. For instance, a rule that has been adopted
through notice and comment rulemaking can only be repealed or changed
through notice and comment rulemaking. 9 This can be difficult, because
adopting any rule through notice and comment rulemaking can be time
consuming and resource intensive. 10 Congress and the courts impose many
procedural requirements on the rulemaking process to ensure that agencies
engage in a transparent, deliberative process that involves public input and
generates a rational decision. 11 Since agencies can anticipate that most major
4. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
5. Id.
6. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66.
7. See Bruff, supra note 1, at 472. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2012) (delegating authority to
the President to revise the national contingency plan under the Superfund law).
8. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 1008–10; Stack, supra note 1, at 266–67; Strauss, supra note
1, at 754. Academics who espouse a “Presidential control” model for administrative agencies, rather
than an “expertise” model, disagree. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 1, at 2251–52; Kathryn A. Watts,
Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 6 (2009).
9. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
10. See Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA
Rulemaking from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 773 (2008) [hereinafter Johnson, Ossification’s
Demise?]; Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385–86 (1992) [hereinafter “McGarity, Some Thoughts”].
11. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 10, at 774–78 (describing the variety of
procedural requirements imposed by legislation, judicial decisions, and Executive Orders);
McGarity, Some Thoughts, supra note 10, at 1400–12. See also Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky
Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 86–98 (2018) (describing several judicial limits, including
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regulations will be challenged in court, 12 they have an incentive to take as much
time as is necessary to create a “bulletproof” rule that can withstand judicial
challenges. 13 While many have criticized the modern notice and comment
rulemaking process as “ossified,” 14 others have recognized that the ossification
creates “sticky regulations” on which the regulated community and the public
can rely. 15 If an agency follows the appropriate procedures and adopts a rule that
is reasonable and within its statutory authority, the public and the regulated
community can be assured that the rule cannot be changed based on a whim, but
can only be changed after a time consuming, resource intensive, deliberative
process with opportunities for public participation. 16 As Professor Aaron
Nielson notes, “the same procedures that make it hard to create policy also make
it hard to rescind policy. . . . Ossification thus acts as a commitment mechanism.
Almost by definition, the more difficult it is for an agency to change its policy,
the less likely it is that the agency will do so.” 17

“hard look” review, the “material comments” doctrine, the “logical outgrowth” doctrine, and the
“good government” justification for many of the procedural limits on rulemaking); Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1755 (2007);
Caitlin McCarthy et al., Dialogue: The Burden of Unburdening: Administrative Law of
Deregulation, 48 ELR 10767, 10768 (2018).
12. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise?, supra note 10, at 768, 771–73 (discussing studies
that have found that agency rules are invalidated in 30%–50% of the cases in which they are
challenged and noting that former EPA Administrator William Ruckleshaus claims that 80% of the
rules adopted by EPA while he was Administrator were challenged).
13. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 98–99.
14. See Charles W. Tyler & E. Donald Elliott, Administrative Severability Clauses, 124 YALE
L.J. 2286, 2328 (2015); Richard J. Pierce Jr., Rulemaking Ossification is Real: A Response to
Testing the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1493 (2012); Stephen M. Johnson,
The Internet Changes Everything: Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government
Information Through the Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 283–84 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson,
Internet]; Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response to
Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 528–36 (1997) [hereinafter McGarity, Response]; Mark
Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review
of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 483 (1997); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven
Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 64 (1995); McGarity, Some
Thoughts, supra note 10, at 1428–29. One relevant definition of “ossify” is “to make callous, rigid,
or inactive.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 1597 (1993).
15. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 90, 131. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10768.
16. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 92. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10770.
17. See Nielson, supra note 11, at 116, 118. Justice Neil Gorsuch is less optimistic that
administrative law principles can adequately prevent agencies from making knee-jerk political
decisions. While he was a judge on the Tenth Circuit, Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion in
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, in which he criticized the deference accorded to agencies under the
Chevron doctrine, arguing that de novo review was necessary because stakeholders “must always
remain alert to the possibility that the agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime
based merely on the shift of political winds and still prevail.” 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (2016) (Gorsuch,
J., concurring). Later in the opinion, Gorsuch laments that “an agency can enact a new rule of
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In addition to the procedural impediments referenced above, the Supreme
Court has imposed other restrictions on agencies that prevent them from hastily
changing rules based on political whims. For instance, when an agency changes
a rule, the agency must “display awareness that it is changing position” and
“show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” 18 In addition, an agency
must provide a reasoned explanation whenever it disregards facts and
“circumstances that underlay or were engendered by its prior rule.” 19 An agency
rule can be held to be “arbitrary and capricious” if there is an “unexplained
inconsistency” in agency policy. 20 Consequently, when an agency adopts a rule
to repeal or replace a prior rule, to the extent that the agency is changing its
interpretation of the facts or law underlying the prior rule, or, to the extent that
the new rule conflicts with the agency’s prior interpretation of the facts or law
underlying the rule, the agency must acknowledge that and rationally explain the
reasons for the change in interpretation. 21
In light of all of these restrictions, when an agency runs the procedural
gauntlet of notice and comment rulemaking and adopts a rule that is within the
agency’s statutory authority, a reasonable exercise of discretion, based on
agency expertise, and supported by a strong factual record, it is very difficult to
repeal the rule solely on political grounds, especially if the attempts to repeal the
rule come shortly after the rule was initially adopted. Nevertheless, when there
is a change in Administration and the incoming President is a member of a
different political party than the outgoing President, it is quite common for the
new President to attempt to repeal or replace rules adopted by the previous
Administration. 22
This Article illustrates the manner in which the administrative law checks
and balances work to limit a President’s ability to change a rule based on purely
political factors, by focusing on a rule adopted in 2015 by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
and the three rulemaking efforts initiated after the change in Administration in
2017 to repeal and replace the rule.

general applicability affecting huge swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the
next.” Id. at 1154.
18. See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2126 (2016).
19. Id. See also F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (Scalia, J. for the
plurality). In a concurring opinion in F.C.C. v. Fox TV Stations, Inc., Justice Kennedy wrote, “an
agency’s decision to change course may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores or
countermands its earlier factual findings without reasoned explanation for doing so. An agency
cannot simply disregard contrary or inconvenient facts that it made in the past[.]” Id. at 537
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
20. See Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126.
21. See William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in
Administrative Law, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1396, 1401 (2018).
22. See Ari Cuenin, supra note 3, at 472. See also infra Part III.
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The rule was initially adopted by EPA and the Corps in 2015 to define the
scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United States”
(“WOTUS”) under the Clean Water Act. 23 The agencies’ rules in effect prior to
the 2015 rule had been interpreted in, and narrowed by, three Supreme Court
decisions. 24 In the 2015 rule, the agencies crafted a new definition of “waters of
the United States” based on the agencies’ expertise and their long-standing
interpretations of those three Supreme Court cases. 25 The agencies supported the
2015 rule with a scientific study that was based on more than 1200 other peer
reviewed scientific studies 26 and an economic analysis that demonstrated that
the benefits of the rule clearly outweighed the costs of the rule. 27 The agencies
provided the public with more than six months to comment on the rule and
finalized it after reviewing over a million public comments. 28
Since the American Farm Bureau had led the opposition to the 2015 rule and
since middle American farmers were major supporters of the President in his
2016 election, President Trump acted quickly to attempt to eliminate the 2015
WOTUS rule after he took office in 2017. 29 In his second month in office, the
President issued an Executive Order directing EPA and the Corps to rescind or
revise the 2015 rule and to revise it in a way that narrowed the government’s
jurisdiction, based on an interpretation of one of the Supreme Court cases that
conflicted with the agencies’ prior interpretation of the case. 30
After that, EPA and the Corps initiated three separate rulemakings designed
to prevent the 2015 rule from being implemented and to repeal and replace that
rule. The first proposed rulemaking was initiated to repeal the 2015 rule and
23. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
24. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 716 (2006); Solid Waste Agency v. United
States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172, 175 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
25. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054.
26. See Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis
of the Scientific Evidence, EPA (Jan. 2015), https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/risk/recordisplay.cfm?deid
=296414 [https://perma.cc/S9C9-EWTB] [hereinafter Connectivity Study]. See Connectivity of
Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Review and Synthesis of the Scientific Evidence,
80 Fed. Reg. 2100, 2100 (Jan. 15, 2015).
27. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Economic
Analysis of the EPA-Army Clean Water Rule, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (May 20, 2015),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-06/documents/508-final_clean_water_rule_eco
nomic_analysis_5-20-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/DXW5-9VS8].
28. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057.
29. More than 75% of rural voters in the Farm Belt supported President Trump. See Ted
Genoways, Farmers voted heavily for Trump. But his trade policies are terrible for them, WASH.
POST (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/10/24/
farmers-voted-heavily-for-trump-but-his-trade-policies-are-terrible-for-them/ [https://perma.cc/H
W9D-K7BD].
30. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
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reinstate the regulatory landscape that existed prior to the 2015 rule, in order to
give the agencies time to craft a new rule to replace the 2015 rule. 31 When the
agencies could not finalize that rule quickly enough, they adopted a second rule
that delayed the implementation of the 2015 rule by two years. 32 The third
proposed rulemaking was initiated to develop the new definition of “waters of
the United States” to replace the definition adopted in the 2015 rule. 33 However,
the agencies made fundamental errors of administrative law and statutory law in
each of those rulemakings. One of the agencies’ rules has already been
invalidated for those errors and the other two will likely be invalidated as well,
when they are finalized.
This Article will discuss the procedural and substantive flaws in the three
rulemaking efforts by the agencies. One or more of the rules (or the 2015 rule)
will likely be litigated for the next several years and, ultimately, it is likely that
the question of the scope of the federal government’s jurisdiction over “waters
of the United States” will return to the Supreme Court. However, since
challenges to those rules must originate in Federal district courts, 34 it could take
some time before the question returns to the Court.
Part II of this Article discusses the 2015 rule, including the motivation for
the rule, the development of the rule, public and congressional reaction to the
rule, legal challenges to the rule, and President Trump’s reaction to the rule when
he took office. Part III of the Article discusses the limits imposed on agencies
when they change regulations and briefly discusses the numerous instances
when the Trump Administration has failed to comply with those limits. Part IV
of the Article outlines the efforts taken by the Trump Administration to repeal
and replace the 2015 rule and Parts V through VII examine the procedural and
substantive flaws in each of the three rulemaking efforts. Finally, Part VIII
ponders the fate of a WOTUS rule should one be ultimately reviewed by a
Supreme Court that has added several new members since the Court last ruled
on the scope of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over “waters of the United
States.”
I. THE 2015 RULE AND ITS ORIGIN STORY
EPA and the Corps of Engineers have adopted many regulations over the
years to define the government’s jurisdiction over “navigable waters” under the
Clean Water Act. Shortly after Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution

31. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. 328).
32. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” —Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018).
33. See Revised Definition of Waters of the United States, 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154 (Feb. 14,
2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 110.1).
34. See Nat. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
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Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Corps of Engineers adopted a narrow
definition of “navigable waters” that only covered waters that were currently
navigable, historically navigable, or potentially navigable. 35 That regulatory
definition was quickly invalidated by the federal district court for the District of
Columbia in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway. 36 In striking
down the Corps’ definition, the court noted that “Congress by defining the term
‘navigable waters’ in Section 502(7) of the [Clean Water Act] to mean ‘the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas,’ asserted federal
jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. Accordingly, as used in the [Clean]
Water Act, the term is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability.” 37
Consistent with the court’s holding, the Corps amended its regulations in
1975 38 and 1982 39 to cover a much broader universe of waters as “navigable
waters” or “waters of the United States.” The 1982 regulations asserted
jurisdiction over the traditional navigable waters that were regulated in the 1974
regulations, but also regulated interstate waters and wetlands; intrastate waters
the use, degradation, or destruction of which could affect commerce; tributaries
of any of those waters; and wetlands adjacent to any of those waters. 40 The Corps
amended the regulations again in 1986, but did not make any significant changes
to the scope of jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” at that time. 41 In
1988, EPA adopted a regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” that
was substantially the same as the Corps’ definition. 42
Over the past thirty-five years, the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of
portions of those regulations in three different cases. First, in 1985, in United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes the Court considered whether the Clean
Water Act authorized the Corps of Engineers to regulate, as “waters of the

35. See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115,
12,119 (Apr. 3, 1974) (defining “navigable waters” as “those waters of the United States which are
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in
the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce.”). This was the
definition that the Corps used for the term in the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899,
ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 403–407 (2012).
36. 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
37. Id.
38. See Navigable Waters; Permits for Activities, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,319, 31,320 (July 25, 1975).
39. See Permit Regulations; Interim Rule and Request for Comment, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,794,
31,797–98 (July 22, 1982).
40. See Permits for Discharges of Dredged or Fill Material into Waters of the United States,
33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a) (1982).
41. See Permit Regulations: Regulatory Programs, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,206, 41,210 (Nov. 13,
1986).
42. See Water Pollution Control: State and Federal 404 Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 20,764, 20,764
(June 6, 1988).
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United States,” wetlands that are adjacent to traditional navigable waters. 43 A
unanimous Court upheld the Corps’ authority in that case, deferring to the
Corps’ under the Chevron analysis, based on the expertise of the Corps and
EPA. 44 The Riverside Bayview Homes Court held that regulation of adjacent
wetlands was necessary to achieve the broad purposes of the Clean Water Act
in Section 101(a) “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 45 and EPA and the Corps concluded that
wetlands adjacent to navigable waters “play a key role in protecting and
enhancing water quality.” 46 The Court noted that “the Act’s definition of
‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of the United States’ makes it clear that the
term ‘navigable’ as used in the Act is of limited import,” 47 and the Court further
supported its conclusion that the government could regulate waters that were not
“navigable” in the traditional sense by citing legislative history that indicated
that Congress intended to regulate as broad a category of waters as authorized
under its Commerce Clause powers. 48
Sixteen years later, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), the Court reviewed the
Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over isolated ponds
based on the agency’s “migratory bird” test. 49 The Corps used the test as one
way to determine whether a water was an intrastate water “the use, degradation
or destruction of which could affect . . . commerce,” one of the categories of
“waters of the United States” under the Corps’ regulations. 50 Under the test, the
Corps asserted jurisdiction over intrastate waters which are or would be used by
migratory birds. 51 In a 5–4 decision, the Court rejected the agencies’ calls for
Chevron deference and read the Clean Water Act narrowly, based on the
constitutional avoidance canon. 52 Under the canon, a court will interpret a statute
to avoid an interpretation that raises serious constitutional issues unless the
language of the statute clearly indicates that Congress intended the potentially
unconstitutional interpretation. 53 The Court noted that similar concerns arise

43. 474 U.S. 121, 123 (1985).
44. Id. at 123, 131, 134.
45. Id. at 132.
46. Id. at 133.
47. Id.
48. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 133, citing S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, p. 144
(1972); 118 Cong. Rec. 33756-33757 (1972) (statement of Rep. Dingell).
49. 531 U.S. 159, 159 (2001).
50. Id. at 163.
51. Id. at 164. Although the court refers to the Corps’ “migratory bird rule,” the test used by
the Corps was not a legislative rule, but was merely mentioned in the preamble to the Corps’ 1986
regulation defining “waters of the United States.” Id. at 184 n.12.
52. Id. at 174.
53. Id. at 172.
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when a federal statute encroaches upon traditional state powers. 54 Since the
Court was concerned that regulation of the waters in the case based on the
migratory bird test raised constitutional issues and encroached on “the States’
traditional and primary power over land and water use,” the Court held that the
Clean Water Act did not authorize such regulation because there was no clear
statement in the statute that authorized the regulation. 55 To the contrary, the
Court noted that Congress chose to “recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities of States . . . to plan the development and use . . . of land and
water resources” in Section 101(b) of the act. 56
The SWANCC Court distinguished the Riverside Bayview Homes case by
noting that “the significant nexus between the wetlands and navigable waters”
informed the Court’s reading of the Clean Water Act in that case. 57 In addition,
contrary to the findings of the Riverside-Bayview Homes Court, the SWANCC
Court concluded that nothing in the legislative history “signifie[d] that Congress
intended to exert anything more than its commerce power over navigation,”
which is presumably narrower than its commerce power generally. 58
Although there were statements in the Court’s opinion that could be read to
suggest that the Court was doing more than simply invalidating the federal
government’s regulation of waters based on the “migratory bird” test, EPA and
the Corps read the opinion narrowly to allow them to continue to regulate
isolated, intrastate waters on grounds other than the “migratory bird” test, 59 and
most courts read the ruling narrowly to exclude only intrastate, non-navigable
waters that lacked any connection to navigable waters. 60 However, guidance
issued by EPA and the Corps after the decision required staff to obtain approval
from Headquarters before asserting jurisdiction over isolated, intra-state, nonnavigable waters 61 and situations in which the agencies asserted jurisdiction over

54. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty., 531 U.S. at 172–73 (2001).
55. Id. at 174.
56. Id. (citing 33 U.S. C. § 1251(b) (2012)).
57. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 168 n.3.
59. See EPA & Corps, Joint Memorandum, 68 Fed. Reg. 1995, 1996 (Jan. 15, 2003). Shortly
after the SWANCC ruling, the EPA General Counsel and Corps Chief Counsel issued a joint
memorandum that indicated that the agencies could regulate isolated, intrastate, non-navigable
waters if the agencies could demonstrate, on a case by case basis, a nexus to interstate commerce
other than the “migratory bird” test. See STEPHEN M. JOHNSON, WETLANDS LAW: A COURSE
SOURCE 114–15 (eLangdell Press, 3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter “JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE”]. That
memorandum was superseded by the 2003 guidance, which required staff to take a more cautious
approach to regulating isolated waters.
60. See Bradford C. Mank, The Murky Future of the Clean Water Act After SWANCC: Using
a Hydrological Connection Approach to Saving the Clean Water Act, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 811, 811,
814, 866 (2003).
61. See EPA & Corps, Joint Memorandum, supra note 59, at 1996.
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those waters declined significantly after SWANCC. 62 The Court’s decision
raised considerable concern among environmental groups because, depending
on how broadly the Court’s decision was applied, between 40–80% of the
Nation’s wetlands could be excluded from coverage under the Clean Water Act,
and many States were not choosing to regulate the waters excluded from federal
protection. 63
The final Supreme Court case to address the scope of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” raised more questions than it
answered. In Rapanos v. United States, the Court was reviewing the Corps’
exercise of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable
waters and wetlands adjacent to those non-navigable tributaries. 64 While all of
the Justices agreed that jurisdiction was not limited to traditional navigable
waters, 65 they agreed on little else. Writing for a plurality of the Court, Justice
Scalia asserted that the federal government could only regulate, as “waters of
the United States,” “relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water”
and “wetlands with a continuous surface connection” to other “waters of the
United States.” 66 Scalia relied on the plain meaning of the term “waters of the
United States” and argued that it was necessary to interpret federal jurisdiction
narrowly in light of the statute’s policy, in Section 101(b), “to recognize,
preserve and protect the primary responsibilities of States . . . to plan the
development and use . . . of land and water resources.” 67 The plurality felt that
the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries as defined in
its regulations and wetlands without a continuous surface connection to other
“waters of the United States” raised the same federalism and Commerce Clause
concerns as the regulation of the isolated ponds in SWANCC. 68 The other five
Justices on the Court rejected the plurality’s narrow reading of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction.
62. See Mank, supra note 60, at 814. The agencies significantly reduced the cases in which
they asserted jurisdiction over vernal pools and playa lakes after SWANCC, despite their ecological
value. Id.
63. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 114–15 (citing Jon Kusler, State
Regulation of Wetlands to Fill the Gap 6 (Association of State Wetlands Managers, Inc., 2004),
https://www.as wm.org/pdflib/swancc_decision_030404.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK3Z-BTC2]).
64. 547 U.S. 715, 728, 730 (2006).
65. See id. at 731 (Scalia, J., for the plurality) (noting that jurisdiction extends beyond
traditional navigable waters); id. at 779–80 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding jurisdiction
whenever a water has a significant nexus to a traditional navigable water); id. at 788 (Stevens, J,
dissenting) (indicating that the Corps’ regulations, which assert jurisdiction over a wide range of
waters beyond traditional navigable waters, should have been upheld under Chevron).
66. Id. at 739, 742. Justice Scalia was joined by Justices Thomas and Alito and the Chief
Justice. Scalia argued that the term “waters of the United States” does not include “channels through
which water flows intermittently or ephemerally.” Id. at 739.
67. 547 U.S. at 737.
68. Id. at 759, 776.
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Justice Kennedy, writing separately, concurred in the Court’s decision to
remand the case to the lower court, but he took issue with the plurality’s reading
of the statute. Kennedy argued that Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC
both established the principle that regulation of waters is appropriate under the
Clean Water Act when the waters have a “significant nexus” to traditional
navigable waters. 69 He rejected the plurality’s tests because they excluded
regulation of some waters that have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable
waters and because they authorized regulation of some waters that lacked such
a “significant nexus.” 70 Addressing the plurality’s concerns about the Clean
Water Act policy in Section 101(b) to preserve traditional State responsibilities
over land and water resource development, Kennedy argued that such concerns
only arose in SWANCC because the federal government attempted to regulate
waters that lack a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters. 71 The
“significant nexus,” he reasoned, should be assessed in terms of the goals and
purposes of the Clean Water Act in Section 101(a) to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 72
Accordingly, he wrote that “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus
come within the statutory phrase ‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more
readily understood as ‘navigable.’” 73 Justice Kennedy indicated that the Corps
could, by regulation, “identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume
of flow (either annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or
other relevant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to
them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an
aquatic system” to justify regulation as “navigable waters.” 74 However, he felt
that the Corps existing regulatory definition of tributaries was too broad, and
allowed the Corps to assert jurisdiction over wetlands that were adjacent to
tributaries in some cases where the wetlands, alone or in combination with
similarly situated lands in the region, lacked a significant nexus to a traditional
navigable water. 75 Consequently, he indicated that the Corps could regulate

69. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 759, 767, 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy argued “to give
the term ‘navigable’ some meaning, the Corps’ jurisdiction over wetlands depends upon the
existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the
traditional sense.” Id. at 779.
70. Id. at 767–78 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 776, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy reasoned that “in most cases regulation
of wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable waters
will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulty.” Id. at 782.
72. Id. at 779 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 781. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id.
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wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, but that they could not rely on
the existing regulation to do so, and would need to demonstrate, on a case-bycase basis, that the wetlands had a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable
water. 76
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent,
argued that the Corps’ regulation of non-navigable tributaries and wetlands
adjacent to non-navigable tributaries should have been upheld under Chevron as
a reasonable interpretation of the statute, in light of its goals in Section 101(a). 77
Stevens reasoned that the Corps determined that wetlands adjacent to tributaries
of traditional navigable waters preserve the quality of the Nation’s waters by
providing habitat for aquatic animals, preventing excessive sediment and toxic
pollutants from entering the adjacent waters, and reducing downstream flooding
and that the Corps’ reasonable interpretation of the term “waters of the United
States” was entitled to Chevron deference. 78 The dissenting Justices argued that
the test for Clean Water Act jurisdiction should be broader than either the
plurality test or the Kennedy “significant nexus” test. However, Justice Stevens
noted that “[g]iven that all four Justices who have joined this opinion would
uphold the Corps’ jurisdiction in . . . all . . . cases in which either the plurality’s
or Justice Kennedy’s test is satisfied—on remand each of the judgments should
be reinstated if either of those tests is met.” 79
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurring opinion to add a few
thoughts about the impact of the case and the agencies’ potential responses to
the case. First, he chided the Corps and EPA for failing to amend their regulatory
definition of “waters of the United States” after SWANCC, indicating that the
agencies would have been given “generous leeway” by the courts under Chevron
when reviewing the agencies’ amended regulatory definition. 80 Then, he
lamented that since there was no majority opinion in Rapanos, “[l]ower courts
and regulated entities will now have to feel their way on a case-by-case basis.” 81
Roberts cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. United States as a
guideline for determining the precedential value of a case with no majority
opinion. 82 In Marks, the Court suggested that “[w]hen a fragmented Court
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of
five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 83

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 782.
Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787–88.
Id. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 757–58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 758 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
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EPA and the Corps responded to the Court’s fractured opinion in a 2008
guidance document that adopted the approach suggested by the dissenting
Justices, asserting jurisdiction whenever either the Kennedy or plurality test was
satisfied. 84 Despite the Chief Justice’s concerns regarding the difficulty of
interpreting Rapanos, lower courts have been fairly uniform in applying the
Kennedy test as the decisive test for jurisdiction or in finding that jurisdiction
exists whenever either the Kennedy or plurality test is met. 85 Nine circuits have
now addressed the issue and none of the circuits has held that the plurality test
is the exclusive test for jurisdiction. 86
Although the courts routinely upheld the agencies’ interpretation of
Rapanos, the agencies’ 2008 guidance required them to undertake a time
consuming, resource intensive process to evaluate, on a case-by-case basis,
whether several categories of waters had a “significant nexus” to navigable
waters to justify regulation. 87 The “guidance documents did not provide the
public or agency staff with information to ensure timely, consistent and
predictable jurisdictional determinations.” 88 In light of Justice Kennedy’s
suggestion, in Rapanos, that the agencies could identify categories of waters that
have a “significant nexus” to navigable waters, and the Chief Justice’s
suggestion, in his Rapanos concurrence, that the agencies would be afforded
generous leeway by courts if they interpreted the Clean Water Act through
regulations, EPA and the Corps initiated notice and comment rulemaking in
84. See U.S. EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (Dec.
2, 2008) (“Rapanos Guidance’’), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/
cwa_jurisdiction_following_rapanos120208.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NW6-ZT72].
85. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 141–42; Patrick Parenteau, The Clean
Water Rule; Not Dead Yet, 48 ENVTL. L. 377, 399–400 (2018); J.B. Ruhl, Proving the Rapanos
Significant Nexus, 33(1) NAT. RES & ENVT. 1 (2018). The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held
that the Kennedy test is the exclusive test for jurisdiction. See United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d
1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc., 464 F.3d 723, 725 (7th Cir.
2006). The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have applied the Kennedy test and reserved the question
whether the plurality test could be an alternative test for jurisdiction. See N. Cal. River Watch v.
Wilcox, 633 F.3d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 2011); Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 633
F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2011). The First, Third, and Eighth Circuits have held that jurisdiction exists
when either test is met. See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2011); United
States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 799 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56, 65–66
(1st Cir. 2006). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits determined that it was unnecessary to identify the
required test because the wetlands at issue in the cases they addressed met both tests. See United
States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 326–
327 (5th Cir. 2008).
86. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 142; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 399–
400; Ruhl, supra note 85, at 1.
87. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,056 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
88. Id.
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2014 to clarify the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United
States.” 89 The agencies proceeded through rulemaking in order to ensure clarity,
predictability, and consistency in determining the scope of federal jurisdiction,
developing categorical rules to replace case-by-case decision-making. 90
During the rulemaking process, the agencies held more than four hundred
meetings with state and local officials, tribes, farmers, small businesses, and
other stakeholders, provided a comment period of more than two hundred days,
and reviewed and responded to more than one million public comments, most of
which supported the agencies’ final rule. 91 The agencies based the final rule on
the statute, science, their interpretation of the Supreme Court decisions, and their
experience and technical expertise in administering the statute. 92 The primary
scientific support for the agencies’ rule was provided by the “Connectivity
Study,” an EPA report that synthesized more than 1200 peer reviewed scientific
studies and that was reviewed by EPA’s Science Advisory Board. 93 The primary
legal support for the agencies’ rule was the “significant nexus” test from the
Supreme Court decisions, which Justice Kennedy counseled must be assessed in
terms of the Clean Water Act’s objectives in Section 101(a) “to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 94
The 2015 rule continued to regulate traditional navigable waters, interstate
waters, the territorial seas, and impoundments of those waters as “waters of the
United States.” 95 The rule also regulated “tributaries” of traditional navigable
waters, interstate waters and the territorial seas as “waters of the United
States.” 96 While prior agency regulations regulated tributaries, the agencies did
not define “tributaries” in the earlier rules. 97 The 2015 rule defined “tributaries”
89. See Definition of “Waters of the United States” Under the Clean Water Act, 79 Fed. Reg.
22,188, 22,188 (April 21, 2014) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
90. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,056 (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
91. Id. at 37,057.
92. Id. at 37,054–55.
93. Id. at 37,057. See also Connectivity Study, supra note 26.
94. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,056, 37,060 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). See also Parenteau, supra note
85.
95. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073–
76.
96. Id. at 37,073.
97. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 389. See also William L. Andreen, The Evolution of Water
Pollution Control in the United States - State, Local, and Federal Efforts, 1789–1972: Part II, 22
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 267 (2003); Congressional Research Service, “Waters of the United
States” (WOTUS): Current Status of the 2015 Clean Water Rule (R45424) 2–3 (Updated Dec. 12,
2018) [hereinafter “CRS Report”]. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion in Rapanos,
expressed concern that the definition of tributaries used by the agencies at the time of the Court’s
decision was likely too broad to serve as a categorical basis for regulating wetlands adjacent to
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as waters that have a defined bed and banks and an identifiable ordinary high
water mark and which flow directly or through another water body to a
traditional navigable water, interstate water or the territorial seas. 98 The
definition did not limit “tributaries” to perennially flowing waters. 99 The
agencies defined “tributaries” as “waters of the United States” because they
found that Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion allowed the agencies to regulate
tributaries as a category if they, either alone or in combination with similarly
situated waters, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of traditional navigable waters100 and because they determined that
there was a scientific consensus in the Connectivity Study that tributaries, as
defined in the final rule, had that significant effect. 101 The 2015 rule also defined,
as “waters of the United States”, “adjacent waters”, including wetlands, ponds,
lakes, and similar waters that are adjacent to traditional navigable waters,
interstate waters, the territorial seas, jurisdictional tributaries, or impoundments
of those waters. 102 “Adjacent” was defined in the rule to mean “bordering,
contiguous, or neighboring,” and was not limited to waters that physically abut

those tributaries. See 547 U.S. at 780–81. In light of that criticism, the 2015 rule adopted a narrower
definition of “tributaries.” See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80
Fed. Reg. at 37,058.
98. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,076.
“Ordinary high water mark” is defined as “that line on the shore established by the fluctuations of
water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a clear, natural line impressed on the bank,
shelving, changes in the character of soil, destruction of terrestrial vegetation, the presence of litter
and debris, or other appropriate means that consider the characteristics of the surrounding areas.”
Id. at 37,126.
99. The agencies concluded that the Connectivity Study and SAB review confirmed that
“[t]ributary streams, including perennial, intermittent and ephemeral streams, are chemically,
physically, and biologically connected to downstream waters, and influence the integrity of
downstream waters.” Id. at 37,057.
100. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,061 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328). The agencies recognized that Justice
Kennedy’s opinion only explicitly provided that wetlands adjacent to non-navigable tributaries
could be regulated as “waters of the United States” if the wetlands, either alone or in combination
with similarly situated wetlands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of traditional navigable waters. Id. However, they concluded that he only
framed his analysis in terms of wetlands because the case before him involved adjacent wetlands,
and they concluded that there was no indication in Kennedy’s opinion that the framework for
evaluating the “significant nexus” for adjacent wetlands should not also apply to tributaries and
other waters. Id.
101. Id. at 37,073. The agencies concluded that “peer-reviewed science and practical
experience demonstrate that upstream waters . . . significantly affect the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of downstream waters by playing a crucial role in controlling sediment, filtering
pollutants, reducing flooding, providing habitat for fish and other aquatic wildlife, and many other
vital chemical, physical and biological processes.” Id. at 37,055.
102. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073.
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other regulated waters. 103 As with tributaries, the agencies regulated “adjacent
waters” in the rule based on a determination that there was a scientific consensus
that those waters, either alone or in combination with similarly situated waters,
significantly affected traditional navigable waters.104 In addition to the waters
that were categorically defined as “waters of the United States,” the 2015 rule
provided that several other categories of waters could be regulated as “waters of
the United States” if a case-by-case evaluation determined that they had a
“significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water. 105 Finally, the rule

103. Id. at 37,080. “Neighboring” includes “all waters located in whole or in part within 100
feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial
seas, an impoundment, or a covered tributary”; “all waters within the 100-year floodplain of a
traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, an impoundment, or a covered
tributary that is located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of that
jurisdictional water”; and “all waters located in whole or in part within 1,500 feet of the high tide
line of a traditional navigable water or the territorial seas, and all waters located within 1,500 feet
of the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes.” Id. at 37,081.
104. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,073
(June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 382).
105. Id. The categories of waters included waters within the 100 year flood plain of traditional
navigable waters, interstate waters or territorial seas, waters within 4000 feet of the high tide line
or ordinary high water mark of traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or territorial seas,
and five types of isolated wetlands that are “similarly situated.” Id. The isolated wetlands subject
to case-by-case analysis include prairie potholes, Delmarva and Carolina bays, pocosins, western
vernal pools in California, and Texas coastal prairie wetlands. Id. The agencies affirmed their longstanding narrow interpretation of SWANCC as invalidating the migratory bird test, but authorizing
regulation of non-navigable intrastate “isolated” waters in appropriate instances. Id. at 37,056. The
agencies chose to regulate the five categories of isolated waters identified in the rule on a case-bycase basis because they concluded that the wetlands were “similarly situated” for purposes of
“significant nexus” evaluation, in light of Justice Kennedy’s suggestion, in his Rapanos
concurrence, that “the significance of wetlands should be evaluated in the aggregate within the
same region.” See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 393. In determining whether waters are “similarly
situated”, the agencies consider whether the waters “function alike and are sufficiently close to
function together in affecting the nearest traditional navigable water, interstate water, or the
territorial sea.” See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,065–66. When evaluating whether the waters are similarly situated “in the region,” the agencies
determined that “the single point of entry watershed is a reasonable and technically appropriate
scale for identifying ‘in the region,’” and that a “single point of entry watershed is the drainage
basin within whose boundaries all precipitation ultimately flows to the nearest single traditional
navigable water, interstate water, or the territorial sea.” Id. at 37,066.
Functions to be considered for the purposes of determining significant nexus are sediment
trapping, nutrient recycling, pollutant trapping, transformation, filtering and transport,
retention and attenuation of floodwaters, runoff storage, contribution of flow, export of
organic matter, export of food resources, and provision of life-cycle dependent aquatic
habitat (such as foraging, feeding, nesting, breeding, spawning, or use as a nursery area) for
species located in traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, or the territorial seas.
Id. at 37,091.
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categorically excluded several waters, including prior converted cropland, waste
treatment systems, certain ditches, and groundwater. 106
In addition to the overwhelming scientific support for the rule, the agencies
justified their final rule with an economic analysis that determined that the rule
would decrease the scope of regulated waters compared to the existing
regulations and historic practice of making jurisdictional determinations and that
the annual benefits of the rule would range from $338.9 million to $554.9
million, compared to annual costs that would range from $158 million to $465
million. 107 The final rule was published on June 29, 2015, with an effective date
of August 28, 2015. 108 Despite the strong scientific and economic basis for the
rule, the broad public participation in development of the rule, and the
potentially limited impacts of the rule, the American Farm Bureau Federation,
Chamber of Commerce, National Association of Manufacturers, and dozens of
States criticized the rule when it was adopted. 109 The critics were concerned that
the rule would expand federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” and
some States were concerned that the agencies did not adequately consult with
them in finalizing the rule. 110 While environmental groups generally supported
the rule, some felt that the agencies could have identified additional waters
categorically as “waters of the United States,” instead of subjecting them to a
case-by-case “significant nexus” evaluation. 111
Within a few months after the rule was finalized, thirty one States, several
industry and trade associations, regulated entities, and environmental groups

106. Id. at 37,059.
107. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 387–88, 395–96. See also Clean Water Rule: Definition
of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054; EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis, supra
note 27, at x–xi. The agencies acknowledged, though, that while the 2015 rule would reduce
jurisdiction compared to the existing regulations and historic practice for determining jurisdiction,
it would result in a slight increase (between 2.84% and 4.65%) in positive jurisdictional
determinations when compared to the agencies’ recent practice, as opposed to historical practice.
See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 387–88, 396. See also EPA & Corps, Economic Analysis, supra
note 27, at 12. While EPA’s economic analysis projected benefits for the 2015 rule around $550
million, a subsequent study by researchers at NYU suggested that the annual benefits of the rule
could be as high as $1 billion. See Derrick Z. Jackson, Trump Swamp Threatens Waters of the
United States, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG (Jan. 14, 2019, 12:33 PM), https://blog.
ucsusa.org/derrick-jackson/trump-swamp-threatens-waters-of-the-us [https://perma.cc/E83P-8T
BD].
108. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,054.
109. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 379, citing Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War,
POLITICO (May 27, 2015), https://politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118
319 [https://perma.cc/L6ZE-7ZVQ] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
110. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 4–6. The American Farm Bureau criticized the rule as
a “nightmare” that would reduce the value of some farms by 40%, and John Boehner, then Speaker
of the House, called it “a tyrannical power grab that will crush jobs.” See Jackson, supra note 107.
111. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 4–6.
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brought lawsuits to challenge the rule. 112 In light of ambiguity in the Clean
Water Act regarding jurisdiction for challenging the WOTUS rule, the lawsuits
were brought in federal district courts and in federal appellate courts. 113 While
the district court cases proceeded in several different courts, the appellate court
challenges were consolidated in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. 114 On August 27, 2015, the day before the rule was scheduled to take
effect, a federal district court in North Dakota issued an order that stayed the rule
in the thirteen States that had brought the lawsuit. 115 On October 9, 2015, after
the rule had been in effect for forty–two days, the Sixth Circuit issued a
nationwide stay of the rule. 116 At that point, EPA and the Corps returned to
enforcing the rules and guidance documents that were in force before the 2015
rule was adopted. 117 As litigation proceeded in the district courts and appellate
courts, the National Association of Manufacturers challenged the jurisdiction of
the appellate courts to review the rule and the Supreme Court agreed to resolve
the jurisdictional question. 118
As challenges proceeded in the judicial arena, several bills were introduced
in the House of Representatives, as free standing legislation or appropriations
riders, to repeal the 2015 rule, to allow the agencies to repeal and replace the

112. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
82 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,901 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328).
113. Id.
114. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015). The Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) denied the Government’s request to consolidate the
district court challenges. See Order Denying Transfer in In re Clean Water Rule, 140 F. Supp. 3d
1340 (U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. 2015).
115. See North Dakota v. U.S. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015). The court enjoined
enforcement of the rule in Dakota, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. Id. The
court concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits because the agencies’
definition of tributary in the rule was too broad and, therefore, arbitrary and capricious and outside
of the agencies’ statutory authority. Id. at 1055–58. In addition, the court concluded that the
agencies’ definition of “neighboring” in the final rule was not a “logical outgrowth” of the
definition in the proposed rule. Id. at 1058. Three years later, the court extended the scope of the
injunction to include Iowa, which had intervened in the lawsuit. See North Dakota v. U.S. EPA,
2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180503 (D.N.D. 2018).
116. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated by Murray
Energy Corp. v. U.S. DOD, 713 Fed. Appx. 489 (6th Cir. 2018). In a very cursory opinion, the
court concluded that the challengers demonstrated a substantial possibility of success on their claim
that the rule’s “treatment of tributaries, ‘adjacent waters,’ and waters having a ‘significant nexus’
to navigable waters is at odds with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rapanos” and that the distance
limitations in the final rule were not a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule. Id. at 807–08.
117. Id.
118. See Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dept. of Def., 137 S. Ct. 811 (2017).
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rule without going through notice and comment rulemaking, or to amend the
Clean Water Act to narrow the statutory definition of “navigable waters.” 119
While the agencies strongly defended the 2015 rule against judicial and legal
challenges for several years, that changed abruptly after the election of President
Trump. Less than two months after he took office, the President issued Executive
Order 13778, entitled “Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism, and Economic
Growth by Reviewing the ‘Waters of the United States’ Rule.” 120 While the
President, in the Order, recognized that there is a national interest in keeping
navigable waters free from pollution, he stressed that the goal should be
achieved while “promoting economic growth, minimizing regulatory
uncertainty, and showing due regard for the roles of the Congress and the States
under the Constitution.” 121 He then directed the EPA and the Corps to review
the 2015 WOTUS rule for consistency with the policies of the Executive Order
and to rescind or revise the rule. 122 Finally, although none of the federal appellate
courts have adopted the plurality opinion of Rapanos as the appropriate test to
serve as the sole basis for determining jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act,
Section 3 of the President’s Executive Order directs the agencies, when revising
the 2015 rule, to “consider interpreting the term ‘navigable waters’ [in the Clean
Water Act] . . . in a manner consistent with the [plurality] opinion . . . in
Rapanos.” 123
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRIMER: HOW TO REPEAL AND REPLACE A RULE;
LESSONS NOT LEARNED BY THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION
When a new President is elected, especially when the new President is a
member of a different political party than the outgoing President, it is not
unusual for the President to make major changes in policies and to attempt to
revoke or replace regulations adopted by prior Administrations. 124 While it is
relatively easy, at least procedurally, to change policies adopted in Executive
Orders or through informal procedures such as non-legislative rulemaking and
informal adjudication, it is much more difficult to change regulations that were
adopted through notice and comment rulemaking. 125 There are significant
119. See CRS Report, supra note 97, at 9–10 (listing nine legislative proposals in the House of
Representatives and a Senate resolution).
120. See Exec. Order No. 13778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12,497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra note 3.
125. Non-legislative rules, such as interpretive rules and policy statements are exempt from the
notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012), and
the APA imposes few procedural limits on decisions made through informal adjudication, other
than a requirement that agencies provide prompt notice when denying a written application,
petition, or other request of an interested person in connection with an agency proceeding, and a
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procedural and substantive hurdles that the new administration must overcome
in order to rescind and replace legislative rules.
First, when an agency has adopted a legislative rule through notice and
comment rulemaking, it can only change that rule by adopting a new rule
through notice and comment rulemaking. 126 While the notice and comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) seem minimal when
compared to the procedures required for formal rulemaking, 127 courts have
interpreted the notice and comment procedural requirements in ways that make
informal rulemaking quite rigorous. For instance, the APA requires agencies to
publish proposed rules in the Federal Register and to provide an opportunity for
the public to comment on the rules, but the law does not explicitly set a minimum
length for the comment period. 128 Nevertheless, courts have read the statute to
require agencies to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment129 and have
struck down agency rules when the agency establishes a comment period that
does not provide the public with an adequate opportunity to evaluate the
proposed rule and provide comments. 130 A “meaningful” opportunity to

brief statement of the grounds for the denial. Id. at § 555(e). Executive Orders can be changed by
subsequent Executive Orders.
126. See Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1993); Nat’l Fam. Plan. & Reprod. Health Ass’n v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Even if the agency only plans to repeal the rule, rather than replace the rule, it must use notice and
comment rulemaking to repeal the rule. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (highlighting APA
Section 551(5)’s inclusion of “repeal of a rule” as a form of rulemaking).
127. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556–57 (2011).
128. See, e.g., North Carolina Growers Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d 755, 770 (4th Cir. 2012).
Although the APA does not set a minimum length for comment periods, Executive Order 12866
suggests that “in most cases,” the comment period for a rule should be at least sixty days. See Exec.
Order No. 12,866 § 6, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
129. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 764. See also Prometheus Radio Project
v. F.C.C., 652 F.3d 431, 449 (3d Cir. 2011); Rural Cellular Ass’n v. FCC, 588 F.3d 1095, 1101
(D.C. Cir. 2009). As the Third Circuit recognized, the purposes of the notice and comment
requirements are “(1) to ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public
comment, (2) to ensure fairness to affected parties, and (3) to give affected parties an opportunity
to develop evidence in the record to support their objections to the rule and thereby enhance the
quality of judicial review.” See Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 449; accord Idaho Farm
Bureau Fed’n v. Babbitt, 58 F.3d 1392, 1404 (9th Cir. 1995).
130. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n v. UFW, 702 F.3d at 770. In North Carolina Growers,
the court concluded that a ten-day comment period was inadequate in light of the complexity of the
rulemaking. Id. The court suggested that the instances in which a ten-day comment period would
be adequate were rare. Id. In addition, the court noted that the agency received 11,000 comments
on the rule that was being amended in the case in an earlier rulemaking after a sixty day comment
period, while the agency only received 800 comments on the proposal being reviewed by the court
when the agency provided a ten-day comment period. Id.
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comment has been held to mean “enough time with enough information to
comment” in light of the complexity of a rule. 131
In addition to requiring agencies to provide the public with a sufficiently
long period of time to comment on a proposed rule, courts have required
agencies, in order to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment, to remain
open-minded during the comment period. 132 If an agency has an “unalterably
closed mind” during the comment period, courts have held that the agency has
not provided the required “meaningful” opportunity for public comment. 133 As
the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has noted,
“[c]onsideration of comments as a matter of grace is not enough.” 134
Similarly, in order to provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment, an
agency must provide the public with the basic data and information necessary to
provide them with an opportunity to comment 135 and may not refuse to allow
comment on major policy issues that the agency will be considering in finalizing
the rule. 136 In North Carolina Growers Association v. United Farm Workers,
shortly after a change in Presidential administrations, the Department of Labor
adopted a rule to suspend rules that the agency previously adopted addressing
the temporary admission of foreign workers to engage in agricultural jobs and
to reinstate the rules that were in place prior to the rules that would be
suspended. 137 Although the agency allowed the public to comment on the
agency’s decision to suspend the rules, the agency indicated that it would not
consider comments on the merits of the rules that were being suspended or the
rules that were being reinstated. 138 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit invalidated the agency’s suspension rule, finding that the agency
violated the APA’s procedures when it “refused to receive comments on and to

131. See Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 453.
132. See id.; Advoc. for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Highway Admin., 28 F.3d 1288, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Alaska Factory Trawler Ass’n v. Baldridge, 831 F.2d 1456, 1467 (9th Cir. 1987);
Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985); Ass’n of Nat’l Advertisers,
Inc. v. F.T.C, 627 F.2d 1151, 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
133. See McClouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(finding that the EPA was applying a RCRA policy regarding computation of contamination levels
as a rule and that the agency failed to provide an adequate opportunity for comment on the rule
because the agency reacted to the comments with a closed mind); Nat’l Tour Brokers Ass’n v. U.S.,
591 F.2d 896, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Nehemiah Corp. of Am. v. Jackson, 546 F. Supp. 2d
830, 847 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Intl Snowmobile Mfrs Assoc v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1261 (D.
Wyo. 2004); Air Transp. Assn of Am. v. Hernandez, 264 F. Supp. 227, 231–32 (D.D.C. 1967).
134. See McClouth, 838 F.2d at 1323.
135. See Am. Med. Ass’n v. Reno, 57 F.3d 1129, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Portland Cement Ass’n
v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
136. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 769–70.
137. Id. at 759–61.
138. Id. at 761.
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consider or explain relevant and significant issues” in the rulemaking. 139 The
court noted that the comments that were foreclosed were “integral to the
proposed agency action and the conditions that such action sought to
alleviate.” 140 When an agency forecloses consideration of such integral
information, the agency is not only violating the APA procedural
requirements, 141 but the agency is acting arbitrarily and capriciously, as it is
failing to “consider an important aspect of the problem,” 142 as the Supreme
Court recognized in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 143
Beyond these procedural roadblocks imposed by the APA, agencies face
substantive roadblocks when repealing or changing legislative rules. While a
change in Presidential administration may be an appropriate reason for an
agency to reassess its legal interpretations and policies, the change in
administration is not a sufficient justification, in and of itself, for changes to
those interpretations and policies. 144 The Supreme Court has clearly provided
that when an agency changes a policy, it must acknowledge that it is changing
the policy and it must provide “good reasons” or a “reasoned analysis” 145 for the
change, or the agency’s change will be held to be arbitrary and capricious. 146 As
the Court stressed in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, in light of the “hard
look” arbitrary and capricious review established in State Farm, an agency must
“articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.” 147 When an agency
supports a rule with factual findings and legal conclusions, it cannot simply
ignore those findings and conclusions when it repeals or changes the rule, but
must explain the reasons for the changes. 148 An “unexplained inconsistency” in
139. Id. at 770.
140. Id. at 769–70.
141. The North Carolina Growers Ass’n court held that the Department of Labor did not
provide a “meaningful” opportunity for comment on the suspension rule by foreclosing comment
on the substance of the rules that would be suspended or reinstated. See 702 F.3d at 770 (citing
Prometheus Radio Project, 652 F.3d at 450).
142. See North Carolina Growers Ass’n, 702 F.3d at 769–70.
143. See 463 U.S. at 43.
144. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1396; Lisa Heinzerling, Laying Down the Law on Rule
Delays, REG. REV. 2 (June 4, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/06/04/heinzerling-layingdown-law-rule-delays/ [https://perma.cc/EU3N-BE7Y].
145. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 57.
146. See Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2126. The APA “requires that the pivot from one administration’s
priorities to those of the next be accomplished with at least some fidelity to law and legal process.”
See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 967 (D.S.C. 2018).
147. Encino, 136 S. Ct. at 2125 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n. of United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
148. Id. at 2126. The Encino Court held that “a reasoned explanation is needed for disregarding
facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the prior policy.” Id. (citing FCC v.
Fox TV Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515–16 (2009)). As in Fox, the Court noted that the policy

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

KILLING WOTUS 2015: WHY THREE RULEMAKINGS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH

395

agency policy is a reason for holding the change in policy to be arbitrary and
capricious. 149
As Professor William Buzbee has noted, Encino, State Farm, and the
Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA 150 require that agencies “engage with
the ‘facts and circumstances that underl[ay]’ earlier agency actions” and
acknowledge and explain the reasons for changes in the agency’s fact-finding,
scientific conclusions, and legal conclusions that supported the earlier actions. 151
He notes that “[a]gency policy is rarely . . . generated due to statutory language
alone,” but also on “contingencies,” factors outside of the statutory text such as
factual and scientific assumptions, political factors, and agency expertise, so
agencies cannot simply reinterpret statutory language when there is a change in
administration, but must explain why the contingencies have changed or why
the agency is no longer motivated by the contingencies. 152 Thus, he argues, in
most cases, an agency cannot justify rescission and replacement of a rule solely
by arguing that the agency has re-interpreted the scope of its statutory authority
and concluded that it did not have the authority to issue the rule in the first place,
but must also address the “contingencies” upon which the earlier rule was
based. 153 In the context of the 2015 WOTUS rule, therefore, the EPA and the
Corps will not be able to simply “re-interpret” the scope of the agencies’
authority under the Clean Water Act and ignore the overwhelming body of
scientific and economic support for the rule when repealing or replacing it. They
that the agency is changing “may have ‘engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken
into account.’” Id.
149. Id.
150. See 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
151. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1401.
152. Id. at 1360–62. As Justice Kennedy wrote in Fox, “an agency’s decision to change course
may be arbitrary and capricious if the agency ignores or countermands its earlier factual findings
without reasoned explanation for doing so. An agency cannot simply disregard contrary or
inconvenient factual determinations that it made in the past, any more than it can ignore
inconvenient facts when it writes on a blank slate.” See 556 U.S. at 537 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Professor Buzbee argues that to the extent that statutes require agencies to consider various
scientific factors or to exercise their expertise, courts may be less willing to uphold policy changes
that are driven by political choices, as opposed to the science or agency expertise. See Buzbee,
supra note 21, at 1362 (citing Ronald M. Levin, Hard Look Review, Policy Change, and Fox
Television, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 555, 565–66 (2011)); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 6–8 (2009).
153. See Buzbee, supra note 21, at 1434–35. Professor Buzbee argues that an agency will need
to engage with the contingencies underlying a rule that is being repealed or changed when the
agency changes its statutory interpretation upon which the rule was based and both the old and new
interpretations are tenable. Id. However, he acknowledges that there may be rare instances where
an agency can convince a court that there was no support for its earlier statutory interpretation and
the court will allow the agency to repeal or change the rule that was based on the invalid statutory
interpretation without requiring the agency to engage with the contingencies underlying the prior
rule. Id. at 1436–37.
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will need to engage with it and explain why the scientific and economic
assumptions that they made four years ago are no longer valid or why the
agencies no longer feel that those assumptions support the rule.
In the first three years after President Trump took office, although the
Administration aggressively pursued a de-regulatory agenda, 154 environmental
and other agencies repeatedly failed to comply with the procedural and
substantive requirements outlined above for repealing and replacing legislative
rules, so courts repeatedly struck down their efforts to roll back those rules. 155
While federal agencies historically have prevailed in about 70% of the cases
brought against them alleging violations of the Administrative Procedures Act,
federal agencies in the Trump Administration only prevailed in about 6% of the
cases decided by March, 2019. 156
Clean Air Council v. Pruitt is an example of the trend. 157 During the Obama
Administration, EPA adopted regulations which went into effect in August 2017
for fugitive emissions of methane and other pollutants created by the oil and
natural gas industries. 158 After the change in Administration, as the date that
industries were required to conduct their first surveys under the regulations
approached, EPA published a notice in the Federal Register, indicating that it

154. In the first two years after he took office, President Trump’s Administration attempted to
repeal or replace 24 environmental rules adopted during the Obama Administration. See Marissa
Horn, 24 Environmental Rules Trump is Rolling Back, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Aug. 23, 2018, 7:59
AM), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/24-environmental-rulestrump-is-rolling-back-1 [https://perma.cc/Y7TK-5HDW]. The Brookings Institute maintains a deregulatory tracker to document the broader efforts of the Trump Administration to repeal and or
replace regulations from prior administrations. See Brookings Institution, Tracking Deregulation
in the Trump Era (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulationin-the-trump-era/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2019).
155. Although this section of the Article is focusing on judicial invalidation of the
Administration’s efforts to roll back environmental rules, the Administration has faced similar
obstacles in court when attempting to roll back regulations outside of the environmental context.
See, e.g., Children’s Hosp. of the King’s Daughters, Inc. v. Azar, 896 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 2018)
(invalidating HHS rule that changed the methodology for calculating financial assistance for
hospitals); Nat’l Venture Cap. Ass’n v. Duke, 291 F. Supp. 3d 5 (D.D.C. 2017) (invalidating a rule
to delay implementation of immigration regulations); Open Communities All. v. Carson, 286 F.
Supp. 3d 148 (D.D.C. 2017) (invalidating a HUD rule to delay a prior public housing regulation);
Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d 553 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (invalidating rules modifying
Affordable Care act regulations).
156. See Fred Barbash & Deanna Paul, The Real Reason the Trump Administration Is
Constantly Losing in Court, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2019.
157. 862 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (holding that the Clean Air Act did not allow the EPA to
stay implementation of several provisions of a final rule regarding methane and other greenhouse
gases, and granting motion to vacate the stay against the EPA’s wishes).
158. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources, 81 Fed. Reg. 35,824,
35,825 (June 3, 2016) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

KILLING WOTUS 2015: WHY THREE RULEMAKINGS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH

397

was staying the regulations for ninety days pending reconsideration. 159 Although
the agency subsequently published a notice of proposed rulemaking to extend
the stay for two years and to reconsider the regulations, 160 the agency did not
use notice and comment rulemaking to stay the regulations for the initial ninety
days. In response to challenges by several environmental groups, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit struck down the stay of the regulations,
dismissing the agency’s assertion that it had inherent authority to briefly stay
regulations without going through notice and comment rulemaking while it
reconsidered them 161 and rejecting the agency’s claim that the language of the
Clean Air Act authorized the agency to stay the regulations pending
reconsideration without going through notice and comment rulemaking. 162
A year later, in Air Alliance Houston v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit struck down
another EPA rule that was designed to repeal and replace an Obama
Administration Clean Air Act regulation. 163 On January 13, 2017, EPA adopted
regulations to prevent the accidental release and to minimize the consequences
of release of various hazardous substances (the “Chemical Disaster Rule”). 164
After the change in administration, EPA issued a rule to delay the effective date
of the accidental release regulations for almost two years, pending the agency’s
reconsideration of the rule. 165 Although the agency used notice and comment
rulemaking to adopt the rule that delayed the accidental release regulations, the
Clean Air Act only authorized the agency to stay such regulations pending
reconsideration for ninety days. 166 When community groups, environmental
groups, and states challenged the agency’s action, the court invalidated the delay
rule, finding that the agency lacked statutory authority to stay the rule beyond
ninety days. 167 The court also held that EPA’s promulgation of the delay rule
159. Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Grant of
Reconsideration and Partial Stay, 82 Fed. Reg. 25,730, 25,730–31 (June 5, 2017).
160. See Emission Standards for New, Reconstructed, and Modified Sources; Stay of Certain
Requirements, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,645 (proposed June 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
161. The court stressed that “it is ‘axiomatic’ that ‘administrative agencies may act only
pursuant to authority delegated to them by Congress.’” Clean Air Council, 862 F.3d at 8 (quoting
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
162. Clean Air Council, 862 F.3d at 9–10. The Court noted that section 307(d)(7)(B) of the
Clean Air Act authorized EPA to stay rules, but only when a petitioner presented an objection of
“central relevance” that was “impracticable” to raise during the public comment period, and the
court concluded that those pre-requisites were not met in the case. Id.
163. 906 F.3d 1049, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Justice Kavanaugh was a member of the panel when
the case was argued, but did not participate in the decision. Id. at 1052.
164. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act, 82 Fed. Reg. 4594 (Jan. 13, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68).
165. See Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management Programs Under the
Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. 27,133 (June 14, 2017) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 68).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(7)(B) (2012).
167. Air All. Houston, 906 F.3d at 1060–61.
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was arbitrary and capricious because the agency didn’t adequately explain its
change in position, as required by Encino, Fox, and State Farm. 168 Specifically,
the court noted that EPA failed to explain “its departure from [the agency’s]
previous conclusions regarding the appropriate and practicable timeline for
implementing the Chemical Disaster Rule” and failed to “explain why the
detailed factual findings . . . [supporting the Chemical Disaster Rule were] now
only ‘speculative.’” 169
The Second Circuit also struck down an effort by a different agency to roll
back environmental protections in Natural Resources Defense Council v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. 170 On December 28, 2016, the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) issued a final rule
to increase the civil penalties for violations of the corporate average fuel
economy (“CAFE”) standards. 171 On July 12, 2017, after the change in
Administration, NHTSA issued a final rule, without providing notice or an
opportunity for comment on a proposed rule, to delay the December 2016 civil
penalty rule “indefinitely” pending reconsideration. 172 The Second Circuit held
that the statute pursuant to which NHTSA acted did not authorize the agency to
indefinitely delay the civil penalty regulations.173 The court also found that
NHTSA violated the APA in issuing its final rule, because the agency did not
provide notice and an opportunity for comment on a proposed rule and because
the agency’s rule did not fit within the APA’s “good cause” exemption from the
notice and comment procedural requirements. 174
Attempts to roll back environmental regulations have also been invalidated
at the federal district court level. For instance, in California v. U.S. Bureau of
Land Management, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California struck down a rule issued by the Department of Interior (“DOI”),
without going through notice and comment procedures, that would postpone the
compliance deadlines for regulations that had gone into effect during the Obama
Administration to regulate venting and flaring of natural gas, and royalties from
those activities. 175 DOI argued that Section 705 of the APA authorized the
agency to postpone the regulations’ compliance deadlines, as it authorizes
agencies, “when [they find] that justice so requires, [to] postpone the effective
168. Id. at 1066.
169. Id. at 1067 (citing Accidental Release Prevention Requirements: Risk Management
Programs Under the Clean Air Act; Further Delay of Effective Date, 82 Fed. Reg. at 27,139).
170. 894 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2018).
171. NHTSA Civil Penalties, 81 Fed. Reg. 95,489 (Dec. 28, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 578).
172. NHTSA Civil Penalties, 82 Fed. Reg. 32,139 (July 12, 2017) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R.
pt. 578).
173. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 894 F.3d at 108.
174. Id. at 113–15.
175. 277 F. Supp. 3d 1106, 1111–12 (N.D. Cal. 2017).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2020]

KILLING WOTUS 2015: WHY THREE RULEMAKINGS MAY NOT BE ENOUGH

399

date of action taken by [them], pending judicial review.” 176 The court, however,
held that while Section 705 authorizes the delay of the effective date of a
regulation that is not yet in effect, it does not authorize the delay of the
compliance date of a regulation. 177 The court also held that the indefinite
postponement of the compliance dates in the prior regulation was tantamount to
the repeal of that regulation, which could not be done without following notice
and comment procedures. 178 The court’s decision was widely expected, because
the same court issued an almost identical ruling against DOI in the prior year, in
Becerra v. United States DOI. 179
These cases demonstrate a pattern of arrogance or simply indifference to the
procedural and substantive requirements of the APA that apply to the repeal and
replacement of legislative rules. As will be examined in Parts V through VII of
this Article, that pattern continues with the Administration’s efforts to repeal and
replace the 2015 WOTUS rule.
III. EPA AND THE CORPS’ EFFORTS TO RESCIND AND REPLACE THE 2015
WOTUS RULE
EPA and the Corps began their efforts to rescind and replace their 2015 rule
shortly after President Trump issued Executive Order 13778 directing them to
take those actions. Instead of moving ahead with a proposed rule to amend the
definition of “waters of the United States” in the manner suggested by the
Executive Order, though, the agencies decided to amend the rule through a twostep process. As a first step, the agencies planned to adopt a regulation that
would rescind the 2015 regulation and would re-codify the regulatory definition
of “waters of the United States” that existed prior to the adoption of the 2015
regulation. 180 Those regulations, and the agencies’ guidance interpreting those
regulations, were being implemented in most of the country at the time because
the Sixth Circuit had issued a nationwide stay of the 2015 rule. 181 However, the
agencies realized that the nationwide stay might be lifted if the Supreme Court,

176. Id. at 1117–18 (emphasis added) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 705 (2012)).
177. Id. at 1118.
178. Id. at 1121.
179. See 276 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964–65 (N.D. Cal. 2017). In another case, Pineros y Campesinos
Unidos v. Pruitt, the District Court for the Northern District of California invalidated EPA’s efforts,
without going through notice and comment rulemaking, to delay the effective date of regulations
addressing the certification and use of “restricted use pesticides.” 293 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1062–64,
1066–67 (N.D. Cal. 2018). The court rejected EPA’s claim that the agency could finalize its delay
rule by relying on the “good cause” exception to the notice and comment requirements. Id. at 1066–
67.
180. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82
Fed. Reg. 34,899 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
181. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 803
F.3d 804, 807–08 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated, 713 F. App’x. 489 (6th Cir. 2018).
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in the case before it at the time, ultimately concluded that the federal appellate
courts lacked jurisdiction to hear the initial challenges to the 2015 rule. The
agencies likely anticipated that the Step One (“repeal”) rulemaking would ensure
that the pre-2015 regulations would be implemented during the time that it
would take to develop a rule consistent with the Executive Order. As the second
step of the agencies’ two-step process, the agencies planned to adopt a regulation
that would replace the pre-2015 regulations and define “waters of the United
States” in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in
Rapanos. 182
The agencies published a notice of proposed rulemaking for the “Step One”
rule on July 27, 2017 and were, once again, flooded with comments. 183 It soon
became apparent that the agencies would not be able to finalize the Step One
rule to rescind the 2015 rule before the Supreme Court reached a decision that
could trigger a vacation of the Sixth Circuit stay and reinstatement of the 2015
rule. As a result, on November 22, 2017, the agencies issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to add an “applicability date” to the 2015 rule that would delay
implementation of the rule for two additional years. 184 In less than 3 months, on
February 6, 2018, the agencies finalized that rule (“the suspension rule” or
“applicability date” rule), which provided that the 2015 rule would not be
applicable until February 6, 2020. 185
As the agencies anticipated, the Supreme Court reached a decision regarding
the jurisdictional question before the Step One rule was finalized. On January
22, 2018, in National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense,
the Court held that challenges to the agencies’ regulations defining “waters of
the United States” should be brought in federal district court. 186 Consequently,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated its nationwide
stay of the 2015 rule and dismissed all of the consolidated circuit court
challenges to the rule. 187 Although the Sixth Circuit vacated its stay of the 2015
rule, the agencies’ applicability date rule prevented the 2015 rule from being
implemented at that time.
182. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82
Fed. Reg. at 34,902.
183. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
82 Fed. Reg. at 34,899. The agencies received more than 780,000 comments on the proposal.
Waters of the United States—Reinstatement of Preexisting Rules, EPA Docket #
EPA-HQ-OW-2017-0203, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.regulations.gov/docket?D=EPA-H
Q-OW-2017-0203 [https://perma.cc/ESZ9-APF7].
184. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015
Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
185. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015
Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
186. 138 S. Ct. 617, 621 (2018).
187. See In re EPA & Dep’t of Def. Final Rule, 713 F. App’x 489, 490–91 (6th Cir. 2018).
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After the Supreme Court issued its ruling, several lawsuits challenging the
2015 rule that had been stayed pending the outcome of the Supreme Court’s
resolution of the jurisdictional issue moved forward. 188 The United States had
no interest in defending the 2015 rule on the merits in those lawsuits, so the
government urged the courts to continue to stay the litigation because the
applicability date rule prevented enforcement of the 2015 rule until 2020, by
which time the agencies would have adopted new rules to replace the 2015 rule,
so the challenges would be moot. 189 Most courts rejected the government’s pleas
and continued the lawsuits, although the government did little to defend the rule
on the merits. 190 Federal district courts in Georgia and Texas eventually stayed
the enforcement of the 2015 rule in fourteen states. 191
188. See, e.g., Order at 3, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-cv-59 (D.N.D.
Mar. 23, 2015), ECF No. 185; Order, Georgia v. Pruitt, No. 2:15-cv-79 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2015),
ECF No. 144.
189. See Order, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 188, at 10–11; Order,
Georgia v. Pruitt, supra note 188.
190. See Order, North Dakota v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, supra note 188, at 15–16; Order,
Georgia v. Pruitt, supra note 188. While many of the district court challenges proceeded after the
Supreme Court’s decision, two cases in Oklahoma were “administratively closed” at EPA’s
request, while the agencies continued their rulemaking efforts. See Administrative Closing Order
at 2–3, Oklahoma v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, No. 4:15-cv-381 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2018), ECF
No. 56; Administrative Closing Order, Chamber of Commerce of the U.S.A. v. U.S. Env’t Prot.
Agency, No. 4:15-cv-386 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2018), ECF No. 64. As EPA refused to defend the
2015 rule on the merits in litigation, intervenors have stepped in to defend the rule. See Steven M.
Sellers, Environmental Groups Get Nod to Enter EPA Clean Water Suit, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 4,
2019, 11:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/product-liability-and-toxics-law/environmental
-groups-get-nod-to-enter-epa-clean-water-suit [https://perma.cc/A4L4-AQQL]. NRDC and the
National Wildlife Federation are defending the rule in Ohio v. EPA, litigation proceeding in the
Southern District of Ohio. Id.
191. See Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d, 1356, 1370 (S.D. Ga. 2018); Texas v. U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2018). The district
court in Texas rejected the plaintiffs’ request for a nationwide injunction and stayed enforcement
of the rule in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi. Texas v. U.S. EPA, 2018 WL 4518230, at *1–2.
The court did not directly address the merits of the plaintiffs’ challenges but reasoned that, “[w]ere
the Court not to temporarily enjoin the Rule now, it risks asking the states, their governmental
subdivisions, and their citizens to expend valuable resources and time operationalizing a rule that
may not survive judicial review.” Id. at *1. The district court in Georgia enjoined enforcement of
the rule in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Georgia v. Pruitt, 326 F. Supp. 3d at 1370. That court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ were likely to prevail on their claims that the 2015 rule violated the
APA procedures and was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 1365. The United States was forced with
a difficult choice when defending the rule in those cases, regarding the remedy. See Amanda Reilly
& Ariel Wittenberg, Supreme Court Ruling Complicates Next Steps on WOTUS, E&E NEWS (Jan.
22,
2018),
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060071583
[https://perma.cc/8678-V8KB].
Historically, the federal government has strongly contested the authority of federal district courts
to issue nationwide injunctions. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 403. However, the government
wanted the 2015 rule to be struck down nationwide and the Supreme Court’s decision funneled
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While the lawsuits challenging the 2015 rule moved ahead, environmental
groups and States brought lawsuits to challenge the agencies’ applicability date
rule. 192 On August 16, 2018, the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina struck down the applicability date rule and issued a nationwide
injunction against enforcement of the rule. 193 As a result, after that date, the 2015
rule was in force in twenty-two states, while the pre-2015 rules were in force in
the twenty-eight states that were covered by the injunctions issued in North
Dakota, Georgia, and Texas. 194
The agencies’ quest to repeal and replace the 2015 rule continued on
February 14, 2019, when EPA and the Corps published a notice of proposed
rulemaking for the Step Two (“replacement”) rule that would adopt the Rapanos
plurality definition of “waters of the United States.” 195 For those keeping score
at home, that means that the agencies proposed or adopted three rules to repeal
or replace the 2015 rule or to prevent it from being implemented. In each of
those three rulemakings, though, the agencies ignored the lessons that the
Administration should have learned from the plethora of failed rulemakings
outlined in the preceding section, and the agencies failed to comply with the
basic procedural and substantive requirements that must be followed when
agencies repeal or replace regulations. The next sections of this Article explore
the fundamental errors that the agencies made in the Step One rulemaking,
Applicability Date rulemaking, and Step Two rulemaking.
IV. FLAWS IN THE STEP ONE (“REPEAL”) RULEMAKING
A.

The Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

EPA and the Corps published their notice of proposed rulemaking for the
Step One rule to repeal the 2015 rule and replace it with the pre-2015 regulations
on July 27, 2017. 196 The agencies indicated that the purpose of the rulemaking
was to provide consistency, clarity, and continuity. 197 While the agencies had
adopted the 2015 rule to provide predictability, clarity and consistency, the Sixth
challenges to the rule to the federal district courts. Despite their interest in uniformity and a
nationwide return to the pre-2015 rules, the agencies opposed requests in the district courts to enjoin
the rule on a nationwide basis. For an interesting examination of nationwide injunctions, see Samuel
L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017).
192. See infra notes 260–268 and accompanying text.
193. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969–70 (D. S.C. 2018).
194. On July 26, 2019, the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon enjoined the
enforcement of the 2015 rule in Oregon, as well. See Order, Or. Cattlemens Assn. v. U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, No. 3:19-cv-00564-AC (D. Or. July 26, 2019), ECF No. 58.
195. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154–55
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
196. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
197. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82
Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,902 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328).
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Circuit nationwide stay of the 2015 rule was in place at the time the agencies
issued their Step One proposal, so the agencies were enforcing the pre-2015
regulations. If, however, the Supreme Court concluded, as it ultimately did, that
the Sixth Circuit did not have authority to hear challenges to the 2015 rule and
stay the rule, the agencies were concerned that, after the stay was lifted, the 2015
rule would be enforced in parts of the country, while the pre-2015 regulations
would be enforced in other parts of the country, and it might be unclear which
rules applied in which parts of the country. 198 The agencies argued that their
proposal to reinstate the pre-2015 regulations nationwide would avoid that
fractured scenario, thus promoting consistency, clarity and continuity. 199
While the agencies, in the 2015 rule, stressed the centrality of the objectives
of Section 101(a), the agencies in the Step One proposal stressed, instead, the
policy of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act to “recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including restoration,
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources.” 200 While the
agencies, in the 2015 rule, stressed the important role that science plays in
determining which waters should be regulated to meet the objectives of Section
101(a), the agencies in the Step One proposal stressed that the “significant
nexus” determination “is not a purely scientific determination” and that the
determination of what waters should be regulated should be guided by the
objectives and goals of the Clean Water Act, including Section 101(b). 201
Consequently, they spent very little time addressing the science supporting the
2015 rule in their Step One proposal.
While the agencies, in the 2015 rule, forecast that the economic benefits of
the rule would clearly exceed the costs of the rule, the agencies, in the Step One
rulemaking proposal, only two years later, determined that the costs that would
be avoided by repealing the 2015 rule and returning to the pre-2015 regulatory
regime, were between four and seven times as high as the benefits that would be
lost by repealing the 2015 rule. 202
The agencies set an initial comment period of thirty days, but the agencies
limited the scope of the comments that they were willing to accept. 203
Specifically, the agencies indicated that they were soliciting comments “as to
whether it is desirable and appropriate to re-codify in regulation the status quo
198. Id. at 34,902–03.
199. Id. at 34,903.
200. Id. at 34,900.
201. Id. at 34,902.
202. Economic Analysis for the Proposed Definition of “Waters of the United States”—
Recodification of Pre-existing Rules, U. S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, 8–12 (June 2017),
https://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/07/07/document_gw_04.pdf [https://perma.cc/KTE2-98RG].
203. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules, 82
Fed. Reg. at 34,899, 34,903 (proposed July 27, 2017) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328).
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as an interim first step pending a substantive rulemaking to reconsider the
definition of ‘waters of the United States’” and that they would not consider
comments addressing the pre-2015 regulatory definition of “waters of the United
States” or any future changes to the definition of “waters of the United
States.” 204
1.

Flaws in the Initial Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

If the agencies had finalized the Step One rule as proposed, based on the
justifications in the notice of proposed rulemaking, the rule would very likely
have been quickly invalidated. 205 First, the agencies’ refusal to allow
commenters to address the pre-2015 regulatory regime or any future changes to
the definition of “waters of the United States” to replace the 2015 rule was
precisely the type of action that the North Carolina Growers Association court
held was “arbitrary and capricious” and deprived the public of their “opportunity
to comment” under the APA. 206 Similarly, the agencies’ limit on comments,
coupled with the tone of the rulemaking, suggested that the agencies were
proceeding with an “unalterably closed mind,” foreclosing the public’s
opportunity for meaningful comment on the rule. 207 In addition, as in the Air
Alliance Houston case, the agencies ignored the mandates of Encino, Fox, and
State Farm and failed to adequately address the reasons that they were
abandoning the vast body of scientific, factual, and legal justifications for the
2015 rule that they relied on just two years earlier. 208 Finally, as many have
noted, the agencies’ re-evaluation of the economic costs and benefits of the 2015
rule appeared arbitrary and capricious. 209 The change in the agencies’
calculation of the costs and benefits for the 2015 rule and for the repeal of the
2015 rule was driven primarily by the fact that the agencies significantly reduced
their calculation of the economic benefits associated with wetlands conservation
in the Step One rulemaking. 210 The agencies reduced their calculation because
204. Id. at 34,903.
205. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 382.
206. See supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text. See also Parenteau, supra note 85, at
382. As Professor Parenteau notes, neither the data used to support the 2015 rule nor the caselaw
supporting the 2015 rule nor the economic benefits of the 2015 changed in the two years between
the adoption of the 2015 rule and the agencies’ proposed repeal. Id. at 406. The only justification
provided by the agencies for their change in position is that the 2015 rulemaking did not include
enough discussion of the importance of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act in determining
jurisdiction under the Act. Id.
209. Id. at 396–97. See also McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,769; James Goodwin,
Practitioner Insights: Fuzzy Math to Assault Environmental Rules, 48 ENV’T. REP. 1559, 1560
(Sept. 29, 2017).
210. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396. Those benefits accounted for almost 90% of the total
economic benefits of the 2015 rule. See Goodwin, supra note 209, at 1559–61.
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they argued that the calculation used to support the 2015 rule was based on
outdated contingent valuation studies. 211 However, in other areas of the Step
One economic analysis, the agencies relied on studies of similar vintage, and
critics argued that more recent studies of public attitude toward wetlands
conservation would likely generate even greater economic benefits for
conservation than found in the studies that were excluded. 212
While there were significant procedural and substantive flaws in the
agencies’ original Step One rulemaking proposal, the agencies did not finalize
the proposal based solely on the original notice.
B.

The Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

After EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt resigned, 213 the agencies attempted to
cure some of the flaws of the initial notice of proposed rulemaking by issuing a
supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking for the Step One rule and providing

211. See Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396–97; McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,777;
Goodwin, supra note 209, at 1559–61. The contingent valuation studies focus on the amount of
money persons were “willing to pay” to protect an acre of wetlands. See Goodwin, supra note 209,
at 1560. By eliminating those studies, and suggesting that the agencies could not place a value on
those benefits, the agencies eliminated almost all of the expected benefits of the 2015 rule. Id. See
also Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396.
212. See McCarthy, et al., supra note 11, at 10,777; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 396–397.
Goodwin and Parenteau both note that studies would likely show that the public places a higher
value on conserving wetlands today than they did at the time of the outdated studies, suggesting
that the contingent valuation studies underestimated, if anything, the true benefits of the 2015 rule.
See Goodwin, supra note 209 at 1561; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397. Critics have also argued
that the agencies inappropriately used the 1986 regulation landscape, rather than the 2015 rule, as
the baseline for the economic analysis of the Step One repeal rule. See McCarthy, et al., supra note
11, at 10,769; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397. Although the 2015 rule was stayed at the time the
agencies issued the notice of proposed rulemaking for the Step One rule, the lifting of the stay was
imminent and arrived before the Step One rule was finalized. In addition to those criticisms,
Professor Parenteau notes that the Institute for Policy Integrity at New York University also
criticized the agencies because their economic analysis assumed that states would protect wetlands
that were left unprotected by repeal of the 2015 rule, which was an erroneous assumption because
twenty-four states, including states containing the largest areas of wetlands to be left unprotected
by the repeal rule, do not provide any additional protection for wetlands that are not protected by
the federal government. Parenteau, supra note 85, at 397.
213. See Coral Davenport et al., E.P.A. Chief Scott Pruitt Resigns Under a Cloud of Ethics
Scandals, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/scott-pruittepa-trump.html [https://perma.cc/EYJ8-YDSR]; Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Scott Pruitt Steps
Down as EPA Head After Ethics, Management Scandals, WASH. POST (July 5, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-epa-head-steps-down-after-wave
-of-ethics-management-scandals/2018/07/05/39f4251a-6813-11e8-bea7-c8eb28bc52b1_
story.html [https://perma.cc/SJK8-528S].
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a thirty day comment period for the supplemental notice. 214 The agencies
addressed the North Carolina Growers Association problem raised by their
initial proposal by broadening the scope of comments solicited to include the
merits of the 2015 rule and pre-2015 regulations. 215 As in the initial notice, the
agencies re-asserted that the proposed action was necessary to provide
regulatory certainty for States, regulated entities, and the public, as challenges
to the 2015 rule created uncertainty regarding the scope of Clean Water Act
jurisdiction. 216
The agencies also attempted to justify their decision to repeal the 2015 rule
by advancing several criticisms to the rule based on their reinterpretation of the
statute and case law supporting the 2015 rule. 217 Throughout the supplemental
notice, the agencies repeatedly asserted that the 2015 rule was flawed because
the agencies, in that rule, relied too heavily on science, rather than law, to
determine the scope of waters regulated under Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test. 218 Further, the agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that the
2015 rule inappropriately altered the balance between federal and State
governments in contravention of Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act. 219
Based on a narrower reading of Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion than the
agencies adopted in the past, the agencies also argued, in the supplemental
notice, that the 2015 rule inappropriately expanded the definitions of
“tributaries” and “adjacent wetlands” to include waters that lack a “significant
nexus” to jurisdictional waters and inappropriately defined the “region” to be
evaluated when considering whether a water has a “significant nexus” to a
traditional navigable water.220
214. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,227 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). The agencies
ultimately received over 100,000 comments on the supplemental notice. Id at 32,230.
215. Id. at 32,231.
216. Id. at 32,228. The agencies claimed that the substantial experience that they had in
administering the pre-2015 regulations would advance regulatory certainty. Id.
217. Id. The agencies suggested that “[a]t a minimum, . . . the interpretation of the statute
adopted in the 2015 rule is not compelled and raises significant legal questions.” Id.
218. Id. at 32,240–41.
219. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed.
Reg. 32,227, 32,228 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In the Step One
rulemaking, the agencies continue to rely on the Kennedy “significant nexus” test as the basis for
determining jurisdiction over “waters of the United States,” rather than the Rapanos plurality test.
220. Id. at 32,228–29. (In describing the “significant nexus” test in his concurring opinion in
Rapanos, Justice Kennedy wrote that “[A] water has a significant nexus when any single function
or combination of functions performed by the water, alone or together with similarly situated waters
in the region, contributes significantly to the chemical, physical, or biological integrity of the
nearest . . . [primary] water.”) Id. at 32,240; See also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 780 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The agencies argued, in their supplemental rulemaking, that they interpreted Justice
Kennedy’s language too broadly in the 2015 rule when they defined “region” to encompass a
“watershed” and when they focused, in the 2015 rule, on the contribution of all of the waters in the
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Flaws in the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

While the agencies’ supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking may have
reduced, or eliminated, challenges to a final Step One rule based on failure of
the agencies to provide the public with an opportunity to comment, there are still
significant flaws in the rulemaking. 221 The agencies’ supplemental notice did
not modify the economic analysis that was prepared for the initial notice of
proposed rulemaking, so the agencies’ re-evaluation of the costs and benefits of
the 2015 rule in the Step One rule is still likely arbitrary and capricious. 222 In
watershed, rather than simply the wetlands in the watershed. See Definition of “Waters of the United
States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,240 (proposed July 12, 2018)
(to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In addition to the concerns outlined above, the agencies, in the
supplemental notice, expressed concern that “many features that are categorically jurisdictional
under the 2015 rule . . . test the limits of the scope of the Commerce Clause because they may not
have the requisite effect on the channels of interstate commerce.” Id. at 32,249.
221. EPA and the Corps finalized the Step One rulemaking in September 2019. See Lisa
Friedman & Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Rolls Back Clean Water Protections, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/climate/trump-administration-rollsback-clean-water-protections.html [https://perma.cc/NKZ6-TP49] A pre-publication version of the
rule is available in Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules,
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). In the final rule,
the agencies relied heavily on many of the justifications that they set forth in the supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking. Specifically, the agencies argued that it was necessary to repeal the
2015 rule because the agencies (1) did not believe that the rule was authorized by the statute, in
light of their reinterpretation of the statute and the Riverside Bayview, SWANCC, and Rapanos
precedents; (2) felt that the 2015 rule did not adequately accord weight to the policies of Section
101(b) of the Clean Water Act; (3) were concerned that the rule could be unconstitutional and
beyond statutory authority to the extent that it interferes with traditional state authority over land
use; and (4) believed that there were procedural errors in the rulemaking and that a portion of the
rule was not supported by an adequate record. Id. at 56,627, 56,629, 56,639. In addition, they
repeated their assertion that regulatory certainty would be best served by repealing the 2015 rule
and reinstating the pre-2015 regulatory regime. Id. at 56,659. Further, the Step One rule was
challenged by several environmental groups in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina on
October 23, 2019 and was challenged by fourteen states, the District of Columbia, and the City of
New York in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on December 19, 2019.
See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Wheeler, No. 2:19-cv-03006, 2019 U.S. Dist.
(D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2019); New York v. Wheeler, No. 19-11673, 2019 U.S. Dist. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20,
2019).
222. See supra notes 209–212 and accompanying text. When the agencies finalized the Step
One rule, they modified the economic analysis that they prepared for the Step One rule and the
economic analysis that was prepared for the 2015 rule. See Definition of “Waters of the United
States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56,662. However, they did not cure
the deficiencies in the wetland valuation studies noted above. See supra notes 209–212 and
accompanying text. The agencies dismiss any concerns that are raised over the legitimacy of their
economic analyses, though, by arguing that the analyses are provided for information purposes
only, as the agencies must repeal the 2015 rule because it is beyond their statutory authority. See
Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at
56,663.
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addition, the criticisms that the agencies made to the 2015 definitions of
“region,” “tributaries,” and “adjacent waters” are based on a flawed reading of
Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence. 223 Since the agencies are relying on
those flawed interpretations and a claim that the repeal of the 2015 rule is
necessary to ensure regulatory certainty, which is not true, the agencies have not
provided a reasonable explanation for their decision to repeal the 2015 rule. 224
Finally, in the supplemental notice, the agencies failed to adequately and
reasonably address the reasons that they were abandoning the vast body of
scientific evidence that supported the 2015 rule, arguing, instead, that the
determination of a “significant nexus” should not be based on science, but on
law and policy.
a.

Regulatory Certainty

The agencies suggested, in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking,
that the 2015 rule should be repealed and replaced with the pre-2015 regulatory
framework because there have been several lawsuits filed challenging the 2015
rule and there could be confusion created if some of those lawsuits invalidate
223. The agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that it was inappropriate for them to
define the “region” to be examined when determining whether a water has a “significant nexus” to
jurisdictional waters to include all of the similarly situated waters, rather than just wetlands, in the
watershed. See 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,240. However, the agencies noted, in the 2015 rule, that nothing
in Justice Kennedy’s opinion suggested that the “significant nexus” determination should only
focus on wetlands in a region, rather than waters in a region, and that the determination should
focus on evaluating impacts of waters in light of the goals and purposes of Section 101(a) of the
Clean Water Act. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,061, 37,066. The agencies criticized the 2015 definition
of “tributary,” in their supplemental notice, on the grounds that the definition failed to consider
volume, duration, and frequency of flow of water in a tributary, which made it possible to regulate
small waters that may lack a “significant nexus” to jurisdictional waters. See Definition of “Waters
of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,241 (proposed July
12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). However, the 2015 rule defined tributary more
narrowly than prior regulations (as Justice Kennedy suggested might be necessary), by requiring a
bed and banks and additional indicators of an ordinary high water mark, to limit the term to waters
where the agencies determined the science suggested that the volume, frequency, and flow was
sufficient to provide a “significant nexus” to jurisdictional waters. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,058.
Finally, the agencies, in their supplemental rulemaking notice, argued that it was inappropriate to
regulate “adjacent waters” in the 2015 rule because the waters could be adjacent to very small
tributaries, since the term “tributary” did not consider volume, duration, and frequency of flow of
water. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed.
Reg. at 32,241. However, because the 2015 definition of “tributary” limits jurisdiction to waters
with sufficient volume, frequency, and flow, see id. at 32,240–41, the concerns that the agencies
raised in the supplemental notice are unfounded.
224. The arguments that the agencies made in the step One rulemaking regarding section 101(b)
and the appropriate role of the federal and state governments in defining jurisdiction under the
Clean Water Act are similar to the arguments that they made when they proposed the Step Two
rule. Instead of addressing the flaws in those arguments here, they will be addressed in part VII of
this Article.
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portions of the rule while other lawsuits uphold the rule. 225 However, most of
EPA’s “economically significant” rules are challenged in court. 226 Taken to its
logical end, the agencies’ argument in support of repealing the 2015 rule would
suggest that agencies should almost never adopt rules, since they are likely to be
challenged so frequently. When Congress enacts statutes that require challenges
to agency rules to be brought in federal district courts, as is the case with the
“waters of the United States” rule, 227 it is inevitable that there will be conflicting
interpretations of the rule adopted by district courts and that there could be some
confusion regarding the appropriate interpretation of the statute until the
conflicting decisions are harmonized on appeal, ultimately in the Supreme
Court, if necessary. The fact that a rule must be challenged in federal district
courts that may reach contradictory interpretations of a statute is not, however,
a reason for an agency to refrain from rulemaking.
In addition, while the agencies argued, in the supplemental notice, that they
must repeal the 2015 rule to avoid the confusion that would be created by
conflicting judicial opinions regarding the validity of the 2015 rule, the agencies
would create precisely the same potentially confusing scenario by repealing the
2015 rule and reinstating the pre-2015 regulatory framework, as the repeal rule
would likely be challenged in a variety of federal district courts that may issue
conflicting decisions regarding whether the repeal is valid. 228 That would create
precisely the same confusion that the agencies claimed they were attempting to
avoid by repealing the 2015 rule. Consequently, the agencies’ attempt to repeal
the 2015 rule will not reduce the confusion or increase consistency or uniformity
of the interpretation of the Clean Water Act in any way.

225. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83
Fed. Reg. at 32,229.
226. A review of the “economically significant” rules finalized by EPA between 2001 and 2005
found that 75% of those rules were challenged. See Johnson, Ossification’s Demise, supra note 10,
at 771. This is consistent with statements made by former EPA Administrator William
Ruckleshaus, who indicated that 80% of the agency’s major rules were litigated. Id. at 769.
227. See Nat. Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dept. of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 633 (2018).
228. Even before there are any challenges to the repeal rule, though, a return to the pre-2015
framework would revive a circuit split regarding the controlling opinion/test from Rapanos, with
the net impact that the Clean Water Act—a national federal statute—would apply differently in
different parts of the country. See supra notes 85–86 and accompanying text. Although the
agencies, in their supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, indicated that it was necessary to
repeal the 2015 rule because it had been challenged and invalidated by some courts, but was still
enforced in many areas of the country, see supra note 225 and accompanying text, the agencies, in
their final Step One rule indicated that the fact that the Step One rule may be challenged and
invalidated in some courts, while applied in many areas of the country, was not a reason to prevent
the agencies from finalizing the rule. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification
of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,629 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
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Finally, the agencies asserted that reinstatement of the pre-2015 regulatory
framework would provide for greater regulatory predictability, consistency, and
certainty than the 2015 rule. 229 However, one of the primary reasons that the
agencies adopted the 2015 rule was a widespread perception that the pre-2015
regulatory framework was not providing regulatory predictability, consistency,
or certainty. 230 Regarding the difficulties with the pre-2015 regulatory
framework, the agencies noted, in the 2015 rule, “[t]his rule replaces existing
procedures that often depend on individual, time-consuming, and inconsistent
analyses of the relationship between a particular stream, wetland, lake, or other
water with downstream waters.” 231 The process of making those determinations
was cumbersome and time-consuming in many cases and the decisions were
fraught with litigation risk. 232 The agencies’ assertion that the repeal of the 2015
rule is necessary to ensure clarity, consistency, and predictability, therefore, is
unreasonable.
b.

Failure to Engage with the Scientific Justifications for the 2015 Rule

In the supplemental notice, the agencies spent very little time explaining
why they believed that the science supporting the 2015 rule was invalid or why
they did not believe that the science supported the rule. Instead of engaging with
the science, they argued that calculation of “significant nexus” was a legal
determination that required focus on Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act.233
229. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83
Fed. Reg. 32,227, 32,228 (proposed July 12, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
230. The agencies repeatedly discussed these perceptions in the preamble to the 2015 final rule.
See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,056–57. In particular, they noted, “Members of Congress, developers,
farmers, state and local governments, energy companies, and many others requested new
regulations to make the process of identifying waters protected under the CWA clearer, simpler,
and faster.” Id. at 37,056. When the agencies finalized the Step One rule, they acknowledged that
the pre-2015 regulatory framework was not providing regulatory predictability, certainty or
consistency, but the agencies stressed that they felt that they had to repeal the 2015 rule as it was
beyond their statutory authority. Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of
Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56,627.
231. Id. at 37,057.
232. The agencies even acknowledged, in the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking, that
“implementation difficulties” existed in the pre-2015 regulatory framework. See Definition of
“Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,240.
Nevertheless, they argued that the pre-2015 regulatory framework would somehow provide more
consistency and clarity than the 2015 rule, which established bright line rules for large categories
of waters to reduce the likelihood that jurisdictional determinations would be made on an
inconsistent basis. Id.
233. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. In the final Step One rule, the agencies
repeated their assertions that it was inappropriate to rely on the Connectivity Study in the 2015 rule
because the determination of “significant nexus” is a legal, rather than scientific, determination.
See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg.
at 56,645.
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The agencies attempted to downplay the importance of science to the
determination of the “significant nexus” analysis by noting that Justice Kennedy,
in Rapanos, wrote that scientific evidence provides “no reason to disregard
limits in the statutory text.” 234 However, Justice Kennedy’s full quote, edited by
the agencies in the supplemental notice, provides, “[i]t is true, as the plurality
indicates, that environmental concerns provide no reason to disregard limits in
the statutory text, . . . but in my view the plurality’s opinion is not a correct
reading of the text.” 235 Justice Kennedy was merely acknowledging, as most
judges would, that if a statute is clear, a court should not adopt an interpretation
of the statute that is at odds with the clear language of the statute merely to
advance the purposes of the statute. However, Justice Kennedy felt that the
statute was far from clear in Rapanos. Thus, in the very next sentence, he wrote,
“[t]he limits the plurality would impose, moreover, give insufficient deference
to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act and to the authority of
the Executive to implement that statutory mandate.” 236
Justice Kennedy’s statement in that sentence announced a theme that he
raised repeatedly throughout his opinion. The “significant nexus” required for
Clean Water Act jurisdiction “must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals
and purposes.” 237 In describing what those goals and purposes were, Kennedy
cited Section 101(a) of the statute and not Section 101(b). He wrote, “Congress
enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters . . . .’” 238 He then outlined a science-based test
that was drawn from the goals and purposes of the law. For instance, with regard
to wetlands, he wrote that
the rationale for Clean Water Act regulation is, as the Corps has recognized, that
wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of other waters—
functions such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff storage. . . .
Accordingly, wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the
statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily
understood as “navigable.” 239

Later in the opinion, he noted that it would be permissible for the Corps to
identify categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow (either
annually or on average), their proximity to navigable waters, or other relevant
considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely,
234. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rule, 83
Fed. Reg. at 32,236.
235. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 778 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
236. Id.
237. Id. at 779.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 779–780.
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in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system
incorporating navigable waters. 240

It is clear, from Justice Kennedy’s opinion, that he wanted EPA and the Corps
to rely on science and their expertise to determine when waters, alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other navigable waters.
In addition to mis-characterizing Justice Kennedy’s statements in Rapanos
regarding the importance of scientific justification for the agencies’ application
of the “significant nexus” standard, the agencies, in their supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking, mis-characterized the weight that they gave to science and
the Connectivity Study in the 2015 rule. While the agencies, in the supplemental
notice of proposed rulemaking, suggested that they placed too much emphasis
on the Connectivity Study in developing the 2015 rule instead of focusing on the
text of the Clean Water Act and Congressional intent, the preamble to the 2015
final rule repeatedly rebuts that claim. Although the agencies relied heavily on
the Connectivity Study and the science to support their interpretation of the
appropriate scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction in the 2015 rule, the agencies
repeatedly stressed that the determination of the scope of jurisdiction was based
not only on science, but on the law and their expertise.
For instance, in the preamble to the 2015 final rule, the agencies wrote,
the agencies’ interpretive task in this rule—determining which waters have a
“significant nexus”—requires scientific and policy judgment, as well as legal
interpretation. The science demonstrates that waters fall along a gradient of
chemical, physical, and biological connection to traditional navigable waters,
and it is the agencies’ task to determine where along that gradient to draw lines
of jurisdiction under the CWA. In making this determination, the agencies must
rely, not only on the science, but also on their technical expertise and practical
experience in implementing the CWA during a period of over 40 years. 241

More directly to the point, later in the preamble, the agencies wrote,
[s]ignificant nexus is not a purely scientific determination. The opinions of the
Supreme Court have noted that as the agencies charged with interpreting the
statute, EPA and the Corps must develop the outer bounds of the scope of the
CWA, while science does not provide bright line boundaries with respect to
where “water ends” for purposes of the CWA. Therefore, the agencies’
interpretation of the CWA is informed by the Science Report and the review and
comments of the SAB, but not dictated by them. 242

240. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 781.
241. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054,
37,057 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
242. Id. at 37,060. On the following page, the agencies wrote, “[w]hile a significant nexus
determination is primarily weighted in the scientific evidence and criteria, the agencies also
consider the statutory language, the statute’s goals, objectives and policies, the case law, and the
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As the agencies noted, “[t]he scientific literature does not use the term
‘significant’ as it is defined in a legal context, but it does provide information on
the strength of the effects on the chemical, physical, and biological functioning
of the downstream water bodies from the connections among covered tributaries,
covered adjacent waters, and case specific waters and those downstream
waters.” 243 Thus, the agencies were relying on science to help apply the legal
test articulated by Justice Kennedy. Later, in describing the exclusions from the
definition of “waters of the United States,” the agencies wrote, “[t]he significant
nexus standard arises from the case law and is used to interpret the terms of the
CWA. Thus, a significant nexus determination is not a purely scientific inquiry,
but rather is a determination by the agencies in light of the statutory language,
the statute’s goals, objectives and policies, the case law, the relevant science,
and the agencies’ technical expertise and experience.” 244 It is incorrect,
therefore, for the agencies to claim, in the supplemental notice of proposed
rulemaking, that the agencies gave improper weight to the Connectivity Study
in the 2015 final rule.
Since it was necessary to consider science, law, policy, and expertise in
determining the scope of waters regulated under the Clean Water Act and since
the agencies appropriately considered science in formulating the 2015 rule,
failure to adequately discuss the agencies’ decisions to depart from the scientific
findings that supported the 2015 rule when repealing it is arbitrary and
capricious.
V. FLAWS IN THE APPLICABILITY DATE (“SUSPENSION”) RULEMAKING
A.

The Rulemaking

The applicability date rule (or “suspension rule”), the second of the
agencies’ three rules designed to repeal, postpone, or replace the 2015 rule, was
the first rule that the agencies finalized. The agencies published a notice of
proposed rulemaking for the rule on November 22, 2017, providing twenty-one
days for public comment. 245 As with the initial notice for the Step One rule, the
agencies indicated, in the applicability date rulemaking notice, that the agencies
would not consider comments, in the applicability date rulemaking, regarding
the pre-2015 regulations, the 2015 rule, or the definition of “waters of the United
States” that might be adopted in the future Step Two rulemaking. 246 On February
agencies’ technical expertise and experience when interpreting the terms of the CWA.” Id. at
37,061.
243. Id. at 37,062.
244. Id. at 37,097.
245. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 55,542, 55,542 (proposed Nov. 22, 2017) (to be codified at
33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
246. Id. at 55,544–45.
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6, 2018, less than three months after publishing the notice of proposed
rulemaking, and after receiving fewer than 5000 comments, the agencies
published a final rule that added an “applicability date” to the 2015 WOTUS
rule to delay implementation of the rule until February 6, 2020. 247
In the final rulemaking notice, the agencies indicated that the rule was being
adopted to provide certainty for regulated entities, States, and the public and to
preserve the status quo, because the rule would allow the agencies to continue
to enforce the pre-2015 regulations that they were enforcing while the Sixth
Circuit had stayed the 2015 rule even after the Supreme Court reached a decision
that would lead the Sixth Circuit to lift that stay. 248 Since courts had rejected
several other efforts by the Trump Administration to rely on Section 705 of the
APA or to rely on other statutory provisions to delay or postpone rules that had
already gone into effect without repealing them through notice and comment
rulemaking, 249 the agencies attempted a new approach in the applicability date
rulemaking. Since the 2015 rule included an “effective date” when it was
published and since the rule went into effect in most of the country on August
28, 2015, until it was stayed by the Sixth Circuit, the agencies’ rulemaking added
an “applicability date” to the 2015 rule. The agencies argued that an “effective
date” was simply a term of art that refers to the date that the Office of the Federal
Register amends the Code of Federal Regulations, while an “applicability date”
refers to the date that the rule will be implemented and enforced. 250 The agencies
argued that an “applicability date” can be included in the rule when it is initially
published or it can be added later. 251
For purposes of the economic analysis required for the rule, the agencies
compared the effect of postponing the 2015 rule until 2020 to a baseline set by
the implementation of the pre-2015 regulations during the nationwide stay of the
2015 rule, even though that stay was set to be lifted shortly after the rule was
finalized. 252 Using that baseline, the agencies concluded that the rule would have

247. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5200 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
248. Id. The agencies argued that the extensive experience that the agencies had in making
jurisdictional determinations under the pre-2015 regulations would contribute to the regulatory
certainty. Id. at 5204.
249. See supra notes 175–79 and accompanying text. The agencies clearly indicated, in the
final rule, that they were not relying on Section 705 of the APA to justify their action to postpone
the 2015 rule. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date
to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5204.
250. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5203 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
251. Id. at 5204.
252. Id. at 5202.
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no economic costs and some unquantifiable benefits (due to the regulatory
certainty that would be created by the rule). 253
B.

Flaws in the Rulemaking

When the rule was finalized, it was clear that the rule suffered from many
of the flaws that had sidetracked other Trump Administration efforts to delay,
repeal, or replace rules adopted in prior administrations. The limitations that the
agencies placed on the scope of public comment closely resembled those that
the North Carolina Growers Association court struck down as arbitrary and
capricious and violating the APA procedures for informal rulemaking. 254 The
very short comment period could be challenged as a failure to provide an
opportunity for meaningful public comment as required by the APA. 255 The
short comment period, the limitations on the scope of public comment, and
several comments made by EPA Administrator Pruitt could all demonstrate
evidence that the agencies were not proceeding with an open mind in the
rulemaking, thus depriving the public of an opportunity for meaningful
comment. 256 In addition, the justification provided by the agencies for the
addition of the applicability date was unreasonable, as the rule would not lead to
regulatory certainty, as the agencies claimed. 257 Further, the economic analysis
for the rule was unreasonable, since the agencies measured the effects of the rule
against an inappropriate baseline. 258 Finally, the agencies failed to adequately
253. Id. at 5202–03.
254. See supra notes 137–143 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 128–131 and accompanying text. The agencies argued that the twenty-one
day comment period was appropriate because the APA does not establish a minimum length for the
comment period, courts had upheld comment periods less than 30 days, the scope of the rulemaking
was narrow, and there was an urgent need to finalize the rule expeditiously. Definition of “Waters
of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg.
at 5204. In addition, the agencies argued that the fact that they received over 4,600 comments
indicated that there was an adequate opportunity for the public to meaningfully comment on the
proposal. Id.
256. See supra notes 132–134 and accompanying text. The agencies argued that the litigation
that the Administrator brought to challenge the 2015 rule before he was appointed Administrator
and the comments that he made criticizing the 2015 rule before and after being appointed
Administrator were not sufficient evidence of a closed mind to overcome a presumption of
objectivity for agency officials. See 83 Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of
an Applicability Date to 2015 Clean Water Rule, Fed. Reg. 5200, 5205 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be
codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
257. As noted above, the 2015 rule was initially adopted because the pre-2015 regulations did
not provide uniformity, consistency, or clarity. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In
addition, if the applicability rule were challenged and invalidated in some district courts, but upheld
in others, there would be no more regulatory certainty than there would have been if the rule was
never adopted.
258. Since the Sixth Circuit’s stay of the 2015 rule would be lifted shortly after the applicability
date rule took effect, the economic analysis should have used, as a baseline, the scenario that would
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explain why they had departed from the scientific and factual findings and legal
and policy conclusions that led them to determine that it was appropriate to adopt
the 2015 rule just three years earlier. 259
Not surprisingly, on the date that the agencies published the final rule, it was
challenged in court. New York and nine other States sued EPA Administrator
Pruitt in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing
that (1) the Clean Water Act did not give the agencies the authority to suspend
the 2015 rule after its effective date passed; (2) the agencies did not provide a
meaningful opportunity for comment because the comment period was too short
and the agencies limited the scope of the comments; and (3) the agencies acted
arbitrarily and capriciously by refusing to consider whether postponing the 2015
rule would meet the objectives of the Clean Water Act and by ignoring the
factual and legal findings that supported the 2015 rule. 260 The Natural Resources
Defense Council brought a separate lawsuit in the same court on the same day
against EPA, raising similar arguments as the States. 261
While those cases were brought in New York, a coalition of conservation
groups led by the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League sued EPA and
the Corps in the U.S. District Court for South Carolina and, on August 16, 2018,
the court, in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, invalidated
the rule and issued a nationwide injunction against its enforcement. 262 Citing the
North Carolina Growers Association decision, which the court described as
“almost identical” to the case brought by the conservation groups, the court held
that the agencies’ refusal to allow public comment on the 2015 rule or the pre2015 regulations deprived the public of the meaningful opportunity to comment
have been in place at that time, where the 2015 rule would be enforced in all states except for the
states where the district court in North Dakota had stayed the rule.
259. The failure to address the prior factual, legal, and policy justifications for the 2015 rule
renders the agencies’ rule arbitrary and capricious. See supra notes 147–153 and accompanying
text.
260. See New York v. Pruitt, Case No. 1:18-cv-1030, Complaint (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 7, 2018).
New York was joined in the lawsuit by California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia. Id.
261. See NRDC v. Environmental Protection Agency, Case No. 18-cv-1048, Complaint
(S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 6, 2018). The plaintiffs argued that the agencies acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by failing to repudiate or even discuss the scientific or other findings that supported
the 2015 rule and by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for suspending the rule, as the only
basis provided by the agency, regulatory certainty, had no record support and was contradicted by
the evidence. Id. at 24–26. They also argued that the agencies did not provide a meaningful
opportunity for comment on the rule because they engaged in the rulemaking with an unalterably
closed mind and did not provide a sufficiently long period of time for comments. Id. at 26–27. In a
separate action in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, the Waterkeeper
Alliance and several conservation groups added challenges to the applicability date rule to a lawsuit
that they originally filed to challenge the 2015 rule. See Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Pruitt, Case
No. 18-cv-3521, Complaint (N.D. Cal. filed June 13, 2018).
262. See 318 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (D.S.C. 2018).
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required by the APA. 263 The court indicated that the short duration of the
comment period was also a factor that led it to find that the agencies failed to
provide the public with a meaningful opportunity for comment. 264 Finally, the
court held that the agencies’ failed to provide the “reasoned analysis” required
by State Farm to justify their change in position regarding the 2015 rule and that
the failure to allow comment on the 2015 rule or pre-2015 regulations was
arbitrary and capricious. 265 The court noted that “different administrations may
implement different regulatory priorities, but the APA ‘requires that the pivot
from one administration’s priorities to those of the next be accomplished with at
least some fidelity to law and legal process.’” 266 Even though the conservation
groups’ challenge was brought in federal district court, the court determined that
a nationwide injunction was appropriate because (1) the environmental plaintiffs
were located throughout the United States; (2) the plaintiffs brought a facial
challenge to agency action under the APA; and (3) a nationwide injunction was
necessary to provide complete relief for the plaintiffs. 267 A few months later, in
Puget Soundkeeper Alliance v. Wheeler, the United States District Court for the
Western District of Washington issued a similar ruling, invalidating the rule and
enjoining it nationwide after finding that the agencies acted arbitrarily and
capriciously and failed to provide an opportunity for meaningful public
comment by limiting the scope of public comment on the rule. 268
The agencies initially appealed the South Carolina Coastal Conservation
League decision, but later withdrew their appeal to focus on the Step One and
Step Two rulemakings. 269

263. Id. at 963.
264. Id. As in the North Carolina Growers Association case, the court noted that the suspension
rule received significantly fewer comments during the abbreviated comment period than the 2015
rule which it was repealing received when it was issued with a sixty-day comment period. Id.
265. Id. at 967.
266. Id.
267. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. at 968–69. The Court cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in Califano v.
Yamaski, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979) for the proposition that “the scope of injunctive relief is dictated
by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.” See
id. at 968. While recognizing that nationwide injunctions “have the potential for abuse,” the court
felt that a nationwide injunction was necessary because the effects of the suspension rule were felt
nationwide. Id. at 969 n.4.
268. See No. C15-1342-JCC, 2018 WL 6169196, at *6 (W.D. Wash. 2018). The challengers
also argued that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to address the findings for
the 2015 rule when postponing it and failing to provide a rational justification for the postponement,
but the court determined that it was not necessary to resolve those claims since it was already
enjoining the rule for other APA violations. Id. at *4.
269. See David Schultz, Administration Drops Effort to Delay Obama’s Waters Rule,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (March 9), 2019, https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/administration-drops-effort-to-delay-obamas-waters-rule [https://perma.cc/2XUW-GD8A]
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VI. FLAWS IN THE STEP TWO (“REPLACEMENT”) RULEMAKING
A.

The Proposed Rulemaking

On February 14, 2019, the agencies published a notice of proposed
rulemaking for the Step Two (“replacement”) rule, the third rulemaking initiated
by the agencies to repeal, postpone, or replace the 2015 WOTUS rule. 270 The
agencies began the development of the proposed rule by meeting with
representatives of states, local governments, and tribes in April 2017 and
conducting a series of webinars with other stakeholders in the fall of that year,
before conducting additional meetings with states. 271 As with the other two
rules, the agencies asserted that the replacement rule was necessary to ensure
clarity, consistency, and predictability, since litigation surrounding the 2015 rule
had created inconsistent interpretation and application of the Clean Water
Act. 272 Unlike the other two rules, though, in the Step Two rulemaking proposal,
the agencies made significant changes to their prior legal interpretation of the
Clean Water Act and their long-standing interpretations of the Rapanos and
SWANCC decisions.
Although the agencies acknowledged that the regulatory definition of
“waters of the United States” should advance the Section 101(a) objectives of
restoring and maintaining water quality, the agencies stressed that the definition
must also implement the policy of Section 101(b) to “recognize, preserve and
protect the primary responsibilities of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate
pollution,” and “to plan the development and use . . . of land and water
resources.” 273 Relying on dictionary definitions, the agencies argued that
“policies” must be carried out, while “objectives” are merely aspirational. 274
Proceeding from those assumptions, the agencies noted that Congress, in Section
101(a), established non-enforceable goals in addition to setting forth an
overriding objective. 275 To fulfill those goals, the agencies argued, Congress

270. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4154
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
271. Id. at 4162–63. The agencies held one public hearing on the proposed rule and received
almost 150,000 comments on the proposal. See Revised Definition of Waters of the United States,
EPA Docket # EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.regu
lations.gov/docket?D’EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-0003 [https://perma.cc/2TTL-R7TU].
272. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4154, 4197. The
agencies also suggested that the narrowing of jurisdiction proposed by the rule was necessary to
ensure that the agencies were operating within their Commerce Clause authority. Id. at 4156.
273. Id. at 4156. The agencies claimed that the proposed rule strikes a balance between the
objectives of Section 101(a) and the policies of section 101(b). Id.
274. Id. at 4163–64. Thus, the agencies indicated that they must “pursue” the objectives of the
statute, “aim to accomplish” the goals of the statute, but “implement” the policies. Id.
275. Id. at 4156. In Section 101(a), Congress set goals to eliminate the discharge of pollutants
into the navigable waters by 1985 and to achieve water quality “which provides for the protection
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created several non-regulatory programs in the Clean Water Act, including
programs to address non-point source pollution, to provide infrastructure
funding, and to require water pollution planning. 276 The non-regulatory
programs, they asserted, control pollution in the Nation’s waters generally, while
Congress created a regulatory permitting program to address discharges of
pollutants into a subset of those waters identified as “waters of the United
States.” 277 The regulatory and non-regulatory programs work together to achieve
the objectives of Section 101(a), they argued, but the “waters of the United
States” to be regulated under the permitting program must be defined in a way
that preserves sovereignty of states over their land and water resources. 278
According to the agencies, therefore, since non-regulatory programs apply to the
Nation’s waters generally and help achieve the objectives of Section 101(a), it
is necessary to limit the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United
States” subject to the regulatory permitting requirements in order to carry out
the policy of Section 101(b). This was only the first of many legal reinterpretations advanced by the agencies in the notice of proposed rulemaking.
Unlike the 2015 rule or the pre-2015 regulations and guidance, the proposed
Step Two rule relied heavily on the Rapanos plurality’s test as the primary basis
for determining the scope of “waters of the United States,” as mandated by the
President’s Executive Order, and the agencies reversed several of their prior
positions interpreting Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion in the proposed
rulemaking. 279 As a threshold matter, the agencies relied on the Rapanos
plurality to indicate, as a baseline, that the agencies were regulating “waters”
within the “ordinary meaning” of the term, including relatively permanent
flowing and standing waterbodies, such as oceans, rivers, streams, lakes, ponds,
and wetlands. 280 As a consequence, the agencies defined “tributaries” in the
proposed rule to exclude “ephemeral” streams281 and requested comment on
and propagation of fish, shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water . . .
by July 1, 1983 . . . .” See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2012).
276. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4157
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 4155. When the agencies finalized their Step One rule, they noted that they were not
taking a position on whether Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos was the appropriate
test for determining jurisdiction over “waters of the United States,” but they were repealing the
2015 rule because it was based on that test and the agencies concluded that it exceeded the
boundaries authorized by that test. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification
of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,629 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328)
280. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4169–70
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
281. Id. at 4173. The proposal defines a tributary as “a river, stream or similar naturally
occurring surface water channel that contributes perennial or intermittent flow to a traditional
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whether the definition should also exclude “intermittent” streams. 282 In adopting
that definition, the agencies acknowledged that they were changing their longstanding interpretation of the Rapanos decision as authorizing regulation of
intermittent and ephemeral streams that had a “significant nexus” to traditional
navigable waters. 283 They also suggested that they may have incorrectly
interpreted Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurring opinion in the past by using
the “significant nexus” test to determine jurisdiction over “waters of the United
States” generally, as opposed to limiting its use to determining jurisdiction over
wetlands similar to the wetlands at issue in Rapanos. 284 The proposed rule
frequently criticized the agencies’ prior reliance on their interpretation of Justice
Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test, suggesting that the jurisdictional question
should not be resolved based on “the opinion of a single justice in a complex
case.” 285
In addition to narrowing their definition of “tributaries,” the agencies
narrowed their jurisdiction over adjacent wetlands in the proposed rule,
regulating only wetlands that “abut” jurisdictional waters or have a direct
hydrological surface connection to other jurisdictional waters in a typical
year. 286 Furthermore, the agencies proposed to eliminate the long-standing caseby-case analysis of waters under Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as a
basis for determining jurisdiction 287 and to eliminate the regulation of interstate
waters, which had been regulated as a separate category of waters even in the
pre-2015 regulations, unless those waters fit within another category of
regulated waters. 288
While the agencies spent a significant amount of time in the proposed
rulemaking discussing the legal justifications for the changes in the Step Two
rule from the 2015 rule, they spent very little time rebutting, challenging,
discounting, or even discussing the Connectivity Study and the scientific
findings that supported the 2015 rule. The agencies stressed that the proposed
definition in the Step Two rule was “a legal and policy decision informed by the
navigable water or territorial sea in a typical year either directly or indirectly through other
tributaries, jurisdictional ditches, jurisdictional lakes and ponds, jurisdictional impoundments, and
adjacent wetlands . . . .” Id. at 4155. Later in the proposal, the agencies indicated “tributaries . . .
do not include surface features that flow only in direct response to precipitation, such as ephemeral
flows, dry washes, arroyos, and similar features.” Id. at 4173. They based their exclusion on the
Rapanos plurality opinion. Id. at 4170, 4174.
282. Id. at 4177.
283. Id. at 4175.
284. Id. at 4175, 4196.
285. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4196 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
286. Id. at 4155. Once again, the agencies’ narrower definition was based on the Rapanos
plurality opinion. Id. at 4188.
287. Id. at 4170.
288. Id. at 4171.
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statute, its legislative history, Supreme Court interpretations, and the agencies’
respect for the traditional power of States . . .” and that the Connectivity Study
was “a science, not policy, document . . . .” 289
While regulated entities and some states were pleased with the proposed
rule, scientists and environmental groups strongly criticized the rule because the
agencies were ignoring the science that supported the 2015 rule. 290 The
agencies’ own data suggests that 18% of streams are ephemeral streams and
would no longer be protected under the rule. 291 If intermittent streams are also
excluded in the final rule, almost 59% of the streams in the continental United
States would be left unprotected by the rule. 292 In addition, under the proposed
definition of “adjacent” waters, the agencies’ data suggests that almost 51% of
wetlands would no longer be regulated as “waters of the United States.” 293 Some
areas of the country would be affected particularly acutely. Scientists predict
that more than 75% of Ohio’s streams would no longer be regulated, 294 70% of
South Carolina’s wetlands would no longer be regulated, 295 and 81% of the
streams in the Southwest would no longer be regulated. 296 Scientists are
particularly concerned because they predict that ephemeral and intermittent
streams will play a greater role in water quality protection and flood protection
as climate change brings more storms and flooding. 297 Critics of the rule have

289. Id. at 4175–76.
290. See, e.g., David M. Uhlmann, Trump Wants to Weaken Clean-Water Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/12/opinion/trump-clean-water-weakenrules.html [https://perma.cc/3EGH-JYM4]; Dave Owen, The New WOTUS Proposed Rule and the
Myths of Clean Water Act Federalism, ENVTL LAW PROF. BLOG (Dec. 11, 2018), https://lawpro
fessors.typepad.com/environmental_law/2018/12/the-new-wotus-proposed-rule-and-the-myths-of
-clean-water-act-federalism.html [https://perma.cc/6SWQ-WNV3]; Jackson, supra note 107; See
Beth Burger, Proposed Change Would Leave Most Ohio Streams Unprotected, Environmentalists
Say, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190401/proposedchange-would-leave-most-ohio-streams-unprotected-environmentalists-say [https://perma.cc/2CS
P-M9GD].
291. See Ariel Wittenberg & Kevin Bogardus, EPA Falsely Claims ‘No Data’ on Waters in
WOTUS Rule, E&E NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060109323
[https://perma.cc/88YY-KU73].
292. See Jackson, supra note 107; Parenteau, supra note 85, at 383 (predicting 60% of stream
miles would no longer be regulated, based on EPA and Corps data).
293. See Wittenberg & Bogardus, supra note 291.
294. See Burger, supra note 290.
295. See Chloe Johnson, SC Wetlands—Prized for Habitat and Flood Buffer—Lose Protection
under Trump Water Rule, POST & COURIER (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.postandcourier.com/
news/sc-wetlands-prized-for-habitat-and-flood-buffer-lose-protection/article_e8b1b568-15e7-11e
9-9f73-fb66dc7843a5.html [https://perma.cc/VRH8-VKWX].
296. See Jackson, supra note 107.
297. See Uhlmann, supra note 290. See also Owen, supra note 290 (outlining the benefits of
intermittent and ephemeral streams).
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also argued that the rule could jeopardize more than one hundred thousand jobs
in the ecological mitigation industry. 298
In addition to those concerns, during the comment period for the
rulemaking, the Association of State Wetland Managers (“ASWM”) raised
several policy concerns to the agencies regarding the impact of the proposal on
States. While the agencies argued that the proposed rule would not eliminate
protection for streams and wetlands, but merely transfer regulatory authority for
those waters to States, ASWM pointed out that many of those waters would not
be protected because some states have passed laws that prohibit the states from
protecting waters that are not protected by the federal government and many
states may lack the funding and resources to expand their programs to protect
additional waters that are removed from federal jurisdiction. 299 ASWM also
raised concerns that (1) the proposed reduction in federal jurisdiction would
reduce incentives for States to assume responsibility for administering the
federal Section 404 permitting program; (2) waters that are no longer regulated
by the federal government would no longer receive the protection they currently
receive under the National Environmental Policy Act, the Endangered Species
Act, and other federal laws triggered by the Section 404 permitting process; (3)
the public may view waters that are not protected by the federal government as
less valuable than “waters of the United States”; and (4) the proposed reduction
in federal jurisdiction could create interstate disparity and inconsistency in
protecting waters, as states “race to the bottom” in establishing water quality
protection programs. 300

298. See Jackson, supra note 107. In 2015, researchers at the University of North Carolina and
Yale determined that ecological mitigation programs add up to $9.5 billion and 126,000 jobs to the
American economy every year. Id. An earlier University of Massachusetts study found that
reforestation and land and watershed restoration work add thirty-nine jobs for every $1 million
invested, while the coal industry adds only six jobs for every $1 million invested. Id.
299. See Association of State Wetland Managers, Inc., Comments on the February 14, 2019
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for “Revised Definition of Waters of the United States,” 3–5 (Apr.
15, 2019), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149-4897 [https://per
ma.cc/BY9G-FD3X] [hereinafter ASWM 2019 Comments]. Thirty-six states have laws that could
limit the authority of states to regulate waters that are removed from federal jurisdiction. See
Environmental Law Institute, State Constraints: State-Imposed Limitations on the Authority of
Agencies to Regulate Waters Beyond the Scope of the Federal Clean Water Act (May 2013),
https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/eli-pubs/d23-04.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KM32-7M8Q].
According to a 2015 ASWM survey, only twenty-three states have laws that regulate activities that
affect wetlands. See Status and Trend Report on State Wetland Programs in the United States,
ASWM (2015), https://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/state_summaries/status_and_trends_report_on_
state_wetland_programs_in_the_united_states_102015.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS8Y-5L95].
300. See ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299 at 3–5.
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Flaws in the Proposed Rulemaking

If the Step Two replacement rule is finalized in a form similar to the
proposed rule, it would have serious flaws that should lead to its invalidation. In
the proposed rulemaking, the agencies have (1) adopted an interpretation of the
Clean Water Act that runs counter to the plain language and structure of the
statute; (2) mis-read the Supreme Court’s Rapanos decision and inappropriately
relied on the plurality opinion to support the rule; (3) failed to rationally explain
their departure from their prior legal interpretation of the Clean Water Act and
the Supreme Court’s Rapanos and SWANCC decisions; and (4) failed to provide
a rational explanation for their change in interpretation of the science behind the
2015 rule. 301
1.

Flawed Statutory Interpretation—Section 101(a) and 101(b)—Plain
Meaning

The Clean Water Act should be interpreted in a manner that advances the
goals and objectives of Section 101(a) 302 and should not be interpreted to give
precedence to the policies of Section 101(b) 303 over those goals and objectives.
In the proposed rulemaking, the agencies inappropriately asserted that the statute
should be interpreted to advance the policies of Section 101(b), even though
such interpretation would frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a).
The very first sentence of Public Law 92-500, creating the modern Clean
Water Act, establishes the objective of the statute in Section 101(a) “to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.” 304 Section 101(a) also outlines some aspirational goals for the statute,
including eliminating the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters by
1985 and attaining water quality that provides for the protection and propagation
301. In addition to those flaws, the Attorneys General for fourteen States and the District of
Columbia argued, in their comments to the agencies on the proposed rulemaking, that the agencies’
exclusion of interstate waters as a separate category of “waters of the United States” is contrary to
the Clean Water Act, contrary to legal precedent, and that the agencies did not provide a rational
explanation for changing their prior approach to regulating interstate waters as a category of “waters
of the United States.” See Attorney Generals of New York, California, Connecticut, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and the District of Columbia, Comments on the February 14, 2019 Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking for ‘Revised Definition of Waters of the United States’ (Apr. 15, 2019),
https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-tells-epa-and-army-corps-with
draw-proposal-eliminating [https://perma.cc/AH6N-629S]. The Attorneys General and the
Association of State Wetland Managers both also argued, in their comments on the proposed
rulemaking, that the agencies acted arbitrarily and capriciously by relying on the economic studies
provided to justify the Step Two rulemaking. Id. at 31–33; ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299,
at 25–29.
302. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
303. Id. § 1251(b).
304. Id. § 1251(a).
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of fish, shellfish and wildlife, and provides for recreation in and on the water by
July 1, 1983. 305 In a subsequent provision, Section 101(b), Congress outlined a
policy of the statute “to recognize, preserve and protect the primary
responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution
. . . and to plan the development and use . . . of land and water resources.” 306
In the proposed Step Two rulemaking, EPA and the Corps argued that the
terms “policy,” “goal,” and “objective” have different meanings and that
Congress acted intentionally when identifying policies, goals, and objectives
separately. 307 The agencies relied on dictionary definitions of the terms “policy”
and “objective” to suggest that, based on the ordinary meaning of those terms,
objectives and goals are not binding, while policies are binding. 308 Following up
on that line of argument, they suggested that the policy of Section 101(b) is
superior to the goals and objectives of section 101(a), so that the Clean Water
Act should be interpreted to advance the policy of Section 101(b) even though
it may frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a). 309 However, the agencies
mischaracterized the relationship between goals, outcomes, and policies. Even
though the goals of Section 101(a)(1) and (2) are not binding, neither are the
policies of Section 101(b) or any other section of the statute that identifies
policies. The objectives outlined in Section 101, though, are separate from the
goals outlined in Section 101(a)(1) and (2). An objective is defined in Webster’s
Dictionary as “something toward which effort is directed; an aim . . . or end of
action,” 310 while a policy is defined as “a definite course or method of action
selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and
determine present and future decisions.” 311 In light of those definitions, the
objective is the end, while policies are the means to achieve the end. In
examining ways to achieve an objective, a decision-maker may be guided by
certain policies to choose among approaches that will achieve the objective.
However, the policies are subservient to the objective. The decision-maker
should not treat a policy as the end to which effort is directed. In the proposed
rulemaking, the agencies correctly noted that there is a distinction between the
305. Id. §§ 1251(a)(1), 1251(a)(2).
306. Id. § 1251(b).
307. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4163
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
308. Id. at 4163–64.
309. Id. at 4164 (noting that the word choices of Congress require the agencies to “aim to
accomplish the goals of the Act while implementing the specific policy directives of Congress”)
(emphasis added).
310. See Objective, Merriam Webster (online edition), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/objective [https://perma.cc/SF4W-CNPX]. The agencies cited a similar definition for
objective in their proposed rulemaking. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 4163.
311. See Policy, Merriam Webster (online edition), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/policy [https://perma.cc/Y5HK-BLBF]. The agencies cited a similar definition for
policy in their proposed rulemaking. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 4163.
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word choices made by Congress in identifying the outcomes of the Clean Water
Act in Section 101(a) and policies in Section 101(b). 312 However, the agencies
incorrectly interpreted the difference between the priority of the terms.
A review of the legislative history of Public Law 92-500 demonstrates that
the Conference Report for the legislation, in describing Section 101 of the Act,
focuses on the objectives and goals of Section 101(a), but is silent regarding
section 101(b). 313 Similarly, during Senate consideration of the bill reported
from the Conference Committee, there were nine references to the objectives
and goals of Section 101(a), but no references to Section 101(b). 314 The primary
concern of the Congress that enacted the Clean Water Act was “restor[ing] and
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters,” and the agencies, in their proposed rulemaking, attempted to
subordinate that concern to the “policy” of Section 101(b). 315 That is
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the terms, “objectives,” “goals,” and
“policies,” and is inconsistent with the intent of the enacting Congress. 316
Thus, in interpreting and administering the statute, the agencies should be
guided first and foremost by the objectives of Section 101(a). If there are a
variety of ways to achieve those objectives, some of which interfere with states’
abilities to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, and plan the use and
development of land and water resources and some of which do not, then the
agency should implement the approaches that do not interfere with state
authority. However, the agencies should not adopt an interpretation of the statute
to advance states’ rights when it interferes with achieving the objectives of the
statute. Since the proposed rule does that, it is outside of the agencies’ statutory
authority.
2.

Flawed Statutory Interpretation—Section 101(a) and 101(b)—
Structure of the Statute

In the proposed Step Two rulemaking, the agencies argued that the term
“waters of the United States” under the Clean Water Act should be interpreted

312. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4164 (citing Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 544 (2012)) (“[w]here Congress uses certain
language in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is generally presumed that
Congress acts intentionally”).
313. See S. Rep. No. 92–1236, at 99–100 (reprinted in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at
281, 282–83 (Jan. 1973)).
314. See 118 Cong. Rec. S33692–718 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972) (debate on Conference Report)
(reprinted in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at 161–223 (Jan. 1973)).
315. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012); 33 U.S.C. § 101(b) (2012).
316. See New Prime v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (noting that words should be
“interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning . . . at the time Congress enacted the statute”).
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narrowly based on the structure of the statute. To the extent that there is any
tension between Sections 101(a) and 101(b), the Supreme Court resolved the
tension in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, when the Court held that EPA and the Corps could regulate, under
the Clean Water Act, any waters that have a “significant nexus” to traditional
navigable waters. 317 The proposed rulemaking should have included, in the
definition of “waters of the United States,” all waters that have a “significant
nexus” to traditional navigable waters.
EPA and the Corps argued, in the proposed rulemaking, that Congress
intended to achieve the goals of Section 101(a) by creating non-regulatory
programs that apply to all waters and a permit program that applies to a much
narrower set of “navigable” waters. 318 They argued that, in order to carry out the
policy of Section 101(b), and in recognition of the protection of State authority
in Section 510, the statute should be interpreted narrowly to limit the scope of
waters regulated under the federal permitting program, as waters can be
protected without being regulated under the permitting program. 319
Although the grant programs, technical assistance programs, and watershed
planning programs created for states under the Clean Water Act may apply to
some waters that are not regulated under the Sections 402 or 404 permitting
programs, 320 that does not mean that federal jurisdiction over “waters of the
United States” should be interpreted narrowly. Those state grant, technical
assistance, and planning programs are designed to supplement the protections
provided by the federal permitting program, rather than to replace them. 321
Narrowing the scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United
States” is not necessary to advance the policies of Sections 101(b) or 510. 322 The
statute, as currently interpreted and implemented, recognizes and respects the
317. See 531 U.S. 159, 167–73 (2001).
318. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4157
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
319. Id. at 4157, 4169.
320. Id. at 4156.
321. In their notice of proposed rulemaking, EPA and the Corps argued that “[c]ontrolling all
waters using the Act’s federal regulatory mechanisms would significantly reduce the need for the
more holistic planning provisions of the Act and the state partnerships they entail.” See 84 Fed.
Reg. at 4169. That assertion is erroneous for several reasons. First, neither the 2015 rule or any rule
ever proposed or adopted by the agencies attempt to control “all waters” in the states. Even if the
agencies interpreted the term “waters of the United States” broadly enough to include all waters in
a state, though, the Section 402 and 404 permit programs only apply to point source discharges,
see 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2012), and the regulations adopted by EPA to implement the Section 402
and 404 programs do not target all pollutants that harm health or the environment. State planning
and partnerships with the federal government would still be necessary to address those discharges
or pollutants that are not regulated under the 402 and 404 permitting programs or to address other
problems that are not being sufficiently prevented by the federal permitting programs.
322. See 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2012).
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important role of states while working to achieve the objectives of 101(a).
Section 510 provides that the Clean Water Act does not preempt state regulation
of water pollution and allows states to be more restrictive, but not less restrictive,
than the federal government when protecting water quality. 323 That provision
allows states to adopt and implement their own water pollution control programs
and envisions joint and cooperative federal and state regulation. Nothing in
Section 510 should be read to limit the scope of federal authority over waters of
the United States.
Sections 101(b) and 510 are advanced by several other provisions in the
Clean Water Act that establish a cooperative federal/state regulatory program,
including the 401 certification process and provisions regarding delegation or
assumption of the federal permitting programs.
The Clean Water Act authorizes states to administer the federal Section 402
and 404 permitting programs (with the exception of permitting for Class I
waters). 324 Thus, even if the federal definition of “waters of the United States”
is broad, states have the option of taking over the programs, which allows them
to carry out their “responsibilities and rights . . . to prevent, reduce, and eliminate
pollution . . . and to plan the development and use . . . of land and water
resources.” 325 A narrower definition of “waters of the United States” could
increase the regulatory burden for states, as many states that currently choose to
not take over the federal permitting program because the federal government is
adequately protecting the waters in those states may need to regulate additional
waters in their state permitting programs if federal jurisdiction is reduced.326
In addition to the delegation and assumption authorities provided to states
under the Clean Water Act, Section 401 of the Act authorizes States to impose

323. Id.
324. See id. §§ 1342(b), 1344(g).
325. States may complain that, even if they take over the Section 402 and 404 permitting
programs, a broader definition of “waters of the United States” limits their ability to approve
permits for construction activities that result in a discharge of pollutants or addition of dredged or
fill material into waters under federal jurisdiction. While the designation of waters as “waters of
the United States” may impose some limits on the ability of States to allow land uses that harm the
environment, Section 101(b) should not be read to provide that the federal government cannot
impose any limits on States’ control of land use. After all, Section 101(b) refers to the “primary”
rights and responsibilities of States, rather than the “exclusive” rights and responsibilities of States.
Section 101(b) should be read to allow federal regulation of waters when necessary to achieve the
objectives and goals of Section 101(a).
326. Admittedly, a broader definition of “waters of the United States” could impose regulatory
costs on states because states are required to establish water quality standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1313
(2012), and total maximum daily loads (“TMDL”), id. § 1313(d), for jurisdictional waters. Thus, if
the jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is broad, there are more waters for which states
must create water quality standards and TMDLs. However, under the Clean Water Act, EPA will
establish those standards if States don’t. See id. §§ 1313(b), 1313(c). Therefore, States can avoid
any additional costs if they do not wish to establish standards to protect those waters.
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conditions on federal permits to protect the waters of their State, even when the
State has not taken over a federal Clean Water Act permitting program. 327 Once
again, this is designed to advance the policies of Section 101(b). If the scope of
federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is narrowed, states lose
that authority over those waters and will have to regulate them under state law
to protect them. According to comments provided by the Association of State
Wetland Managers on the supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking
regarding the repeal rule, only twenty-four states have independent dredge and
fill permitting authority. 328 The rest rely on 401 certification.
Narrowing the definition of “waters of the United States” as proposed by the
agencies would frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a) and the policies of
Section 101(b) in another important way. Federal regulation of “waters of the
United States” is important because it protects waters that impact more than one
state and which cannot be controlled by states beyond their own boundaries. 329
States cannot regulate upstream activities that occur in other states that can harm
their water quality. The Supreme Court recognized the important role that the
federal government plays in regulating water bodies that affect multiple States
when it wrote, in International Paper Company v. Oullette, “[w]hile source
States have a strong voice in regulating their own pollution, the CWA
contemplates a much lesser role for States that share an interstate waterway with
the . . . affected States.” 330 Representative Gross discussed concerns regarding
the lax nature of state pollution control prior to the enactment of the Clean Water
Act when, during the House debate on the bill that became Public Law 92-500,
he noted that “[t]hrough the years the States and the local subdivisions of
government, including the municipalities, failed to enforce laws and ordinances

327. See id. § 1341.
328. See Association of State Wetland Managers, Comments of the Association of State
Wetland Managers to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in Response to the July 12, 2018 Federal Register Supplemental Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking Regarding Definition of ‘Waters of the United States’ - Recodification of Preexisting
Rule at 6 (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.aswm.org/pdf_lib/comment_supplemental_notice_%20step
_1_080818.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9Z2-2NEY] [hereinafter “ASWM 2018 Comments”].
329. See ASWM 2019 Comments, supra note 299, at 5. In its comments on the proposed Step
Two rulemaking, the Association of state Wetland Managers argued that the federal role in
administration of the Clean Water Act is essential to the states in protecting states and tribes from
interstate impacts, in ensuring that national level concerns (such as hurricane protection, drought
minimization prevention, minimization of flooding, etc.) are adequately considered, in avoiding
potential impacts on water use allocations by states, in providing protection of habitat, in
maintaining a level economic playing field, and in effectively addressing emerging pollutants as
they are identified and as novel pollution control methods are developed. Id.
330. See 479 U.S. 481, 490 (1987). A long line of Supreme Court cases recognize that federal
law can supersede state law to protect air and water quality even though federal law is regulating
traditional state activities such as land use. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105–06
(1972); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
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in the matter of pollution and especially the polluting of streams.” 331 When the
scope of federal jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is reduced, states
become more vulnerable to pollution of their waters caused by lax regulation in
other states. That result conflicts with the objectives of Section 101(a) and the
policies of Section 101(b) to protect states’ rights and responsibilities. 332
The narrowing interpretation that was proposed by the agencies in the Step
Two rulemaking could also frustrate the objectives of Section 101(a) because it
could lead states to adopt complex, confusing, and inconsistent programs to
regulate the waters that are eliminated from federal protection. States raised
these concerns in response to a 2003 advance notice of proposed rulemaking to
redefine “waters of the United States” after the Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County decision. 333
While there are many reasons why the term “waters of the United States”
should not be interpreted narrowly to reconcile a tension between Sections
101(a) and 101(b) of the Clean Water Act, the primary reason, as noted above,
is that the Supreme Court has already reconciled the tension in Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In that
decision, the Court explicitly noted that interpreting the Clean Water Act to
authorize the regulation of the isolated waters at issue in that case, based on the
migratory bird test, could encroach on a traditional state power. 334 In reading the
statute narrowly to find that it did not authorize jurisdiction in the case, the Court
stressed that the “significant nexus” between wetlands and traditional navigable
waters that existed in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, informed the
Court’s interpretation of the scope of “waters of the United States” under the
Clean Water Act. 335 The message provided by the Court is clear. When a water
has a “significant nexus” to a traditional navigable water, federal regulation of
the water under the Clean Water Act does not violate the policies of Section
101(b). Thus, in crafting their proposed rule to redefine “waters of the United
States,” the agencies should have applied the “significant nexus” test, rather than
attempting to reinterpret the relationship between Sections 101(a) and 101(b).
Since they didn’t, they acted outside of their statutory authority.

331. See 118 Cong. Rec. H10203 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1972) (statement of Rep. Gross) (reprinted
in COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 93d Cong., 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS of 1972, at 349 (Jan. 1973)).
332. Justice Kennedy explained in his Rapanos concurrence that the Clean Water Act policy of
respecting states’ rights under Section 101(b) includes respect for state water pollution policies that
rely on the Clean Water Act to “protect[] downstream States from out-of-state pollution that they
themselves cannot regulate.” See 547 U.S. at 777.
333. See ASWM 2018 Comments, supra note 328, at 4.
334. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 172–73.
335. Id. at 167.
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Inappropriate reliance on the Rapanos plurality opinion

The agencies also inappropriately relied on Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion
in Rapanos as the basis for the proposed Step Two rulemaking. In reliance on
the plurality opinion, they defined “waters of the United States” to be limited to
relatively permanent waters and wetlands with a continuous surface connection
to traditional navigable waters. 336 In further reliance on the plurality opinion,
they eliminated the case-by-case application of the significant nexus test from
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos as a means of determining
jurisdiction over tributaries, adjacent wetlands, and other waters, 337 they
redefined “tributary” to eliminate jurisdiction for ephemeral streams, 338 and they
rejected subsurface hydrologic connections between waters as a basis for
jurisdiction. 339 The agencies inappropriately based the proposed rulemaking on
the Rapanos plurality opinion, rather than Justice Kennedy’s concurring
opinion. 340
The agencies refused to rely on Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Rapanos as the basis for the Step Two rule because they claimed it was “the
opinion of a single Justice.” 341 However, the four dissenting Justices in Rapanos,
wrote that they would find jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act whenever a
water would be regulated under Justice Kennedy’s tests or under the plurality’s
tests. 342 Consequently, five of the nine Justices in Rapanos would utilize Justice

336. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4170 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
337. Id.
338. Id. at 4172–73.
339. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 4188.
340. As noted earlier, Justice Kennedy argued that the “significant nexus” test that was
established in SWANCC was the appropriate test for determining jurisdiction over “waters of the
United States.” See supra notes 69–76, and accompanying text. As he wrote, “[t]aken together,
these cases establish that in some instances, as exemplified by Riverside Bayview, the connection
between a nonnavigable water or wetland and a navigable water may be so close, or potentially so
close, that the Corps may deem the water or wetland a “navigable water” under the Act. In other
instances, as exemplified by SWANCC, there may be little or no connection. Absent a significant
nexus, jurisdiction under the Act is lacking.” See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 767 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The “significant nexus” test, he argued, “prevents problematic applications of the
statute.” Id. at 783. Justice Kennedy was concerned that the plurality’s test did not give sufficient
deference to Congress’ purposes in enacting the Clean Water Act.
341. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4196 (proposed
Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
342. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 787, 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenting Justices would
have upheld broader regulation of waters than the plurality or Justice Kennedy, id. at 788, and
would have upheld the government’s regulations at issue in the case under Chevron v. NRDC, 467
U.S. 837 (1984), but nevertheless indicated that the waters identified in either the plurality or
Kennedy opinions would be “waters of the United States” under their broader reading of Clean
Water Act jurisdiction. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test as one method of determining jurisdiction
under the Clean Water Act.
From the time of the Rapanos decision until the proposed Step Two
rulemaking, in light of the dissent’s counsel, EPA and the Corps interpreted the
Rapanos decision to authorize the federal government to regulate waters under
the Clean Water Act if they satisfied either Justice Kennedy’s “significant
nexus” test or the plurality test. 343 The agencies admitted, in their notice of
proposed rulemaking for the Step Two rule, that they consistently adopted a
broad interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test to support
findings of jurisdiction under the Act, 344 and the agencies have been very
successful defending their interpretation in court. All of the federal appellate
courts that have ruled on the question have held that the agencies can rely on the
Kennedy test exclusively 345 or on the Kennedy and plurality tests to determine
Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “waters of the United States.” 346 None of the
courts has held that the agencies should rely solely on the plurality opinion. In
addition, at oral argument before the Supreme Court in Hughes v. United States,
while the agencies were finalizing the proposed Step One rulemaking, counsel
for the United States cited the Rapanos decision and argued that divided
opinions of the Supreme Court should be interpreted in the manner that the
Corps and EPA consistently interpreted Rapanos until the proposed Step Two
rulemaking. 347 And yet, in the proposed Step Two rulemaking, the agencies
rejected the interpretation that prevailed in all of the federal appellate courts and
proposed an interpretation that has been rejected by all of those courts. To the
extent that the agencies’ proposed rule rejects the Kennedy test in favor of the
Rapanos plurality, the rule is outside of the agencies’ statutory authority.
4.

Failure to Rationally Explain Departure from Prior Legal
Interpretations

While the agencies’ proposed rule is outside of their statutory authority, the
agencies also acted arbitrarily and capriciously in changing their interpretation

343. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 140–43.
344. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4167.
345. See, e.g., Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007).
346. See JOHNSON, COURSE SOURCE, supra note 59, at 142.
347. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, 35, 47–48, 50–52, Hughes v. United States,
138 U.S. 1765 (2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017
/17-155_g314.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AHL-88K8] [hereinafter “Transcript of Oral Argument”].
The Supreme Court granted cert in Hughes to decide “[w]hether [the] Court’s decision in Marks
means that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court where
neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other.”
See Hughes, 138 U.S. at 1772. Ultimately, the Court decided the case without resolving that
question. Id.
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of the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court WOTUS decisions that supported
the 2015 rule without rationally explaining the reasons for the change. As the
Supreme Court noted in Encino Motorcars, “[a]gencies are free to change their
existing policies as long as they provide a reasoned explanation for the change
. . . [b]ut the agency must at least ‘display awareness that it is changing its
position’ and ‘show that there are good reasons for the new policy.’” 348 “[A]n
‘[u]nexplained inconsistency’ in agency policy is a reason for holding an
interpretation to be an arbitrary and capricious change from agency practice.” 349
The agencies argued, in the notice of proposed rulemaking, that a revised
rulemaking based on a change in policy is well within an agency’s discretion
and that a change in administration brought about by people casting their votes
is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive agency’s reappraisal of its
regulations. 350 While a change in administration may be a reasonable basis for a
reappraisal of regulations, a change in administration alone cannot be a
reasonable basis for a change in regulations.
The agencies acknowledged that they were changing their interpretation of
their authority under the Clean Water Act and their interpretations of the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Rapanos and Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County in several regards. 351 To support their changing positions, they
argued that they “re-evaluated their legal authority and those policies that they
deem most important in shaping the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act:
prioritizing the text of the statute, adherence to constitutional limitations,
including the autonomy of the states, and providing clarity to the regulated
community.” 352
However, all of the Supreme Court decisions that the agencies claimed
impacted their changed interpretation of the Clean Water Act were decided
before the agencies adopted the interpretations of the Act that they were
changing in the proposed rulemaking. The interpretations that were being
changed were adopted by the agencies in response to those cases. Subsequently,
all of the circuit courts that reviewed the agencies’ interpretations that were
being changed upheld the interpretations that the agencies were changing. It is
disingenuous, therefore, for the agencies to say that the change is rooted in the
Court’s decisions.
In addition, although the agencies claimed to be changing the interpretations
of the Clean Water Act to reduce confusion and provide clarity, 353 the agencies

348. See Encino, 136 U.S. at 2125–26.
349. Id.
350. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4169
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 358).
351. See, e.g., Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4167, 4169.
352. Id. at 4169.
353. See id. at 4154.
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adopted the 2015 rule to reduce confusion and provide clarity. 354 The agencies
claimed that the 2015 rule could not reduce confusion and provide clarity
because it was challenged in several courts. 355 However, if the agencies finalize
the Step Two rule to replace the 2015 rule, it will be challenged in court as well
and will not reduce confusion or provide clarity any more than the 2015 rule
once it has been challenged. When the agencies, in 2018, adopted a rule that
attempted to suspend the 2015 rule for two years (the “suspension rule”), they
justified it on the grounds that it would reduce confusion and provide clarity. 356
However, that rule was immediately challenged and, within three months, a
federal district court in South Carolina held that it was invalid and issued a
nationwide injunction against its enforcement. 357 As a result of that ruling, at the
time of the Step Two proposal, the 2015 rule was in force in twenty-two states,
while being enjoined in the remaining states by a variety of district courts
reviewing challenges to the 2015 rule. 358 The suspension rule did not provide
clarity or reduce confusion and neither will the agencies’ proposed Step Two
rulemaking.
Looking beyond the facade of reasons provided by the agencies for the
change in interpretation of the Clean Water Act, it is clear that the real reason
for the agencies’ change in position was the Executive Order issued by President
Trump, 359 which, in essence, directed the agencies to repeal the 2015 rule and
replace it with a rule that adopts the reasoning of the plurality opinion in
Rapanos. Congress delegated EPA and the Corps, rather than the President, the
authority to adopt regulations to administer the Clean Water Act. 360 It wanted

354. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,055–57 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
355. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,”84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4197
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
356. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Addition of an Applicability Date to
2015 Clean Water Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 5200, 5202 (Feb. 6, 2018) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt.
328).
357. See South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C.
2018).
358. See Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84
Fed. Reg. 56,626, 56,630 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 358).
359. See Exec. Order No. 13,778, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (Mar. 3, 2017).
360. See 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a) (2012). Congress occasionally delegates authority directly to the
President, rather than administrative agencies. See, e.g., Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93–159, 87 Stat. 627, (repealed); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94–163, 89 Stat. 817. However, Congress did not delegate the authority to define
“waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act to the President. For extended discussions
regarding the power of the President to direct agency decision-making, see Cary Coglianese, The
Emptiness of Decisional Limits: Reconceiving Presidential Control of the Administrative State, 69
ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (20170; Johnson, Disclosing the President’ Role in Rulemaking, supra note 1;
Strauss, supra note 1, at 696–97; Stack, supra note 1, at 264; Kagan, supra note 1; Calabresi &
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the agencies to exercise their expertise to determine important scientific and
policy questions like those intertwined in the statutory definition of waters of the
United States. To the extent that the agencies’ interpretation change was based
solely on the Executive Order, the agencies’ change in position is arbitrary and
capricious.
Ultimately, the agencies justified their rulemaking changes on their incorrect
reading of Rapanos v. United States. When an agency adopts a rule based on a
mis-reading of precedent and fails to justify its rule on other grounds, a court
will invalidate the agency’s rule. 361 In SEC v. Chenery Corporation, the
Supreme Court struck down a decision of the Securities and Exchange
Commission because the agency had failed to exercise its expertise in
interpreting and administering the Public Utility Holding Act, but relied, instead,
on a flawed reading of judicial precedent interpreting the statute. 362 “It is well
established that an agency’s action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis
articulated by the agency itself.” 363 Since the agencies proposed to make several
changes to the 2015 rule based on their erroneous reading of the Rapanos case
and did not provide any justification for the proposed rules based on their
expertise or other rational grounds, the agencies’ proposed changes, if adopted,
will be void in light of the absence of a rational explanation to justify the
changes.
5.

Failure to Rationally Explain Changed Interpretation of the Science
Behind the 2015 Rule

In their notice of proposed rulemaking, the agencies did not rationally
explain why they changed their interpretation of the science that supported the
2015 rule. In the 2015 rule, 364 and earlier, in the guidance applying the
significant nexus test on a case by case basis, 365 the agencies provided strong
scientific support for their decisions to adopt a broad definition of tributaries, 366
to regulate adjacent wetlands based on hydrological and ecological connections
other than surface connections, 367 and to assert jurisdiction over other waters
Prakash, supra note 1; Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 1; Bruff, supra note 1 (outlining the
arguments in favor of, and opposing Presidential control over agency decision-making).
361. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88–93 (1943).
362. Id.
363. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs’ Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983).
364. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054,
37,054 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. 328).
365. See U.S. EPA & U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Following
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (Dec.
2, 2008), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-02/documents/cwa_jurisdiction_follow
ing_rapanos120208.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7M-B9HV].
366. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at
37,058–69.
367. Id. at 37,069–70.
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that the agencies determine, on a case by case basis, have a significant nexus to
waters of the United States. 368 In their Step Two proposal, the agencies rejected
those prior decisions and did not explain how the science changed or why the
prior scientific conclusions could not be supported any more. Instead, they made
a few passing references to comments of EPA’s Science Advisory Board on the
Connectivity Study as evidence that the proposal is “informed by science,” but
they stressed that the questions to be decided by the agencies are legal questions,
rather than scientific questions. 369 The agencies’ failure to engage with the
science and explain why the agencies no longer find the science to support the
rule is unreasonable.
Although the definition of “waters of the United States” is a legal and policy
decision, the Supreme Court resolved the legal question to a large degree in
Rapanos and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County, when it held that
the “significant nexus” test is the test for determining jurisdiction over “waters
of the United States” under the Clean Water Act. The determination of whether
waters have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters is
predominantly a scientific question, rather than a legal question. In Rapanos,
Justice Kennedy wrote that the “significant nexus” required for Clean Water Act
jurisdiction “must be assessed in terms of the statute’s goals and purposes . . . to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters . . . .” 370 As outlined in an earlier section of this Article, in
Kennedy’s opinion, he outlined a science-based test that was drawn from the
goals and purposes of the law. 371 It is clear, from his opinion, that he believed
that science is central to the determination of when waters, alone or in
combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other navigable waters.
The agencies recognized their responsibility to support their interpretation
of the term “waters of the United States” with sound science when they adopted
the 2015 rule and relied on the Connectivity Study to determine which waters
have a “significant nexus” to traditional navigable waters. 372 If, in the Step Two
rulemaking, they are rejecting positions that they took to apply that test in the
past and justified based on science, they cannot ignore the scientific conclusions
368. Id. at 37,071–73.
369. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4175
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328) (definition of “waters of the United
States” is a legal and policy decision). Id. at 4197 (noting that “the 2015 Rule may have failed to
appropriately recognize that the science in the Connectivity Report . . . is not dispositive in
interpreting the statutory reach of ‘waters of the United States,’ which is ultimately a legal
determination.”).
370. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 779.
371. See supra notes 233–40 and accompanying text.
372. See Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37, 054,
37,054–55 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
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that they reached in the past, but must explain how the science supporting their
decisions has changed or why the science no longer supports their prior
decisions. The agencies failed to do that in the proposed rulemaking. The
agencies cited individual statements from the Science Advisory Board’s review
of the Connectivity Study regarding degrees of connectivity to justify their
decision to exclude regulation of ephemeral streams, 373 and to support their
definition of adjacent wetlands, 374 but those isolated statements conflicted with
the great weight of the science that the agencies relied on in crafting the 2015
rule.
VIII. WILL WOTUS RETURN TO THE SUPREME COURT?
In the past four years, EPA and the Corps have initiated and/or finalized four
rulemakings to define, postpone, repeal, or redefine “waters of the United
States” under the Clean Water Act. Two of the rulemakings that have been
finalized have been challenged in court, and it is likely that the other two
rulemakings will be challenged in court as well when finalized. Since the
Supreme Court has addressed the scope of Clean Water Act jurisdiction three
times in the last three and a half decades and since the Court’s Rapanos decision
has proved to be confusing in its application, it would not be surprising to see a
challenge to one of the agencies’ rulemakings eventually finding its way back to
the Supreme Court, but it may be several years before that happens, in light of
the Court’s ruling in the National Association of Manufacturers case that
challenging the rules must originate in the federal district courts.
It is clear that the applicability date rulemaking will not be challenged in the
Supreme Court, as the agencies have abandoned defense of the rule, focusing
instead on the Step One repeal and Step Two replacement rules. It is also very
unlikely that a challenge to the 2015 rule will be heard by the Supreme Court.
The agencies are refusing to defend the 2015 rule on the merits and the agencies
finalized the rule that repeals the 2015 rule and will perhaps even finalize the
rule that replaces the 2015 rule before challenges to the 2015 rule work their
way up to the federal appellate courts, thus mooting out challenges to the 2015
rule. 375 Similarly, it is unlikely that a challenge to the Step One repeal rule will
be heard by the Supreme Court because the agencies plan to finalize the Step
Two replacement rule shortly after finalizing the repeal rule, mooting out

373. See Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4176
(proposed Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328).
374. Id. at 4187.
375. Forecasting in this area becomes very difficult, though, because judicial invalidation of
the repeal and replacement rules could resurrect the 2015 rule, at which point, challenges to the
2015 rule would not be moot.
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challenges to the repeal rule. 376 Thus, if the Supreme Court decides to wade back
in to resolve the scope of the “waters of the United States” under the Clean Water
Act, it will most likely be in the context of reviewing challenges to the agencies’
Step Two replacement rule. Since the rule may not be finalized until 2020 377 and
challenges to the rule must work their way through the federal trial and appellate
levels, it is unlikely that the Court will hear challenges to the rule before the end
of the current Administration and there may be additional changes to the
membership of the Court before a challenge to the rule reaches the Court. Even
if the composition of the Court does not change before a challenge to the
agencies’ Step Two rule reaches the Court, it is difficult to predict how the Court
will rule on the challenge, especially since the agencies have not yet finalized
the Step Two rule. Nevertheless, assuming that the agencies finalize the rule in
a manner that is similar to the proposed rule, without addressing the flaws
outlined above, it is likely that the outcome of the case will depend largely on
the leanings of Justice Kavanaugh.
There have been four changes in the composition of the Court since the
Rapanos decision. Justices Stevens, Souter, Scalia and Kennedy have been
replaced, respectively, by Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh.
Justice Kennedy’s absence will be the most significant, since he will not be
around to defend his Rapanos concurrence and clarify the manner in which he
envisioned the “significant nexus” test should be applied. There is little in the
voting history of Justices Kagan or Sotomayor that would suggest that they
would support the agencies’ interpretation of the Clean Water Act in a Step Two
rule if the interpretation ignored Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in
Rapanos and ignored the purposes of Section 101(a) of the Act, so one might
assume that they would join Justice Breyer and Justice Ginsburg’s call in the
Rapanos dissent for an interpretation of the Act based on science that advances
the objectives of section 101(a). The remainder of this part of the Article,
therefore, focuses on the potential reactions of Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
to a challenge to the Step Two rule.
376. Once again, though, if the replacement rule is invalidated and the repeal rule has not
already been invalidated, the pre-2015 regulations would be put back in place pursuant to the repeal
rule and challenges to the repeal rule would not be moot.
377. See David Schultz, Busy Summer Planned at EPA for New Water Regulations,
BLOOMBERG ENV’T (May 22, 2019), https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-andenergy/busy-summer-planned-at-epa-for-new-water-regulations [https://perma.cc/LS5L-7LMS].
It is possible, though, that the agencies may never finalize the Step Two rule. When they finalized
the Step One rule, they wrote, “[t]hough this final rule is intended to be the first step in a
comprehensive, two-step rulemaking process, the agencies acknowledge that they cannot prejudge
the outcome of the separate rulemaking on a proposed revised definition of ‘waters of the United
States.’” Definition of “Waters of the United States”—Recodification of Preexisting Rules, 84 Fed.
Reg. 56,626, 56,661(Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328). At two other points in the
preamble to the final Step One rule, the agencies noted that it is possible that the Step Two rule
may not be finalized. Id. at 56,654, 56,665.
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While the Court could use the occasion to clarify the weight that courts
should give to a concurring opinion like Justice Kennedy’s under the Marks test,
the Court punted on that question in a similar case last term, Hughes v. United
States, preferring, instead, to resolve the statutory interpretation question anew,
without focusing on the precedent. 378 Since they took that approach so recently
in Hughes, it is likely that they will take a similar approach in a challenge to the
Step Two rulemaking and resolve the statutory question in the case without
determining the weight to accord to Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos concurrence.
A challenge to the agencies’ Step Two rule would likely include a challenge
to the agencies’ statutory interpretation, as well as a challenge to the agencies’
change in position regarding the statutory interpretation and interpretation of the
legal precedent in Riverside-Bayview Homes, SWANCC, and Rapanos, and
maybe even a challenge to the agencies’ change in position regarding the science
supporting the 2015 rule. Although Justice Roberts encouraged the agencies in
Rapanos to adopt a rulemaking to clarify the definition of “waters of the United
States” and asserted that the agencies would receive “generous leeway” under
Chevron if they followed that approach, 379 it is hard to imagine that a majority
of the Court would uphold the agencies’ Step Two rule under Chevron, even if
they ultimately upheld the rule. Justice Gorsuch has been an outspoken critic of
Chevron even before he was appointed to the Court, suggesting that it violates
separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine, 380 and he has continued
his criticism of the doctrine while on the Court. 381
Justice Kavanaugh has not been as vocal as Justice Gorsuch, but Court
watchers suggest that Kavanaugh generally views agencies’ authority narrowly
based on separation of powers concerns 382 and suggest that he is more likely
than many judges to find a statute clear at step one of Chevron if the Court

378. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 347, at 28–29, 35, 47–48, 50–52.
379. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 731 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
380. See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149. Judge Gorsuch outlined his concerns in a
concurring opinion that he authored separately, despite writing the majority opinion in the case.
381. See Evan A. Young, Natural Resources Development and the Administrative State:
Navigating Federal Agency Regulation and Litigation, 10–2 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Fdn. 24–25 (2019).
In his dissenting opinion in BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos, Justice Gorsuch questioned whether
Chevron “retain[ed] any force” and congratulated the Court for deciding the statutory interpretation
question on its own, without relying on Chevron. See 139 U.S. 893, 908 (2019). Justice Thomas
was a member of the plurality in Rapanos, and is a vocal critic of Chevron, see Michigan v. EPA,
135 U.S. 2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring), so, even if he were to support the
agencies’ Step Two rulemaking, he would also not likely do so based on according Chevron
deference to the agency.
382. See Christopher Walker, Judge Kavanaugh on Administrative Law and Separation of
Powers, SCOTUS BLOG (July 26, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/07/kavanaugh-on-ad
ministrative-law-and-separation-of-powers/ [https://perma.cc/S5G7-AB5E].
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applies that test. 383 In his own writings, Justice Kavanaugh has suggested that
agencies might be accorded more deference in Chevron cases when Congress
uses broad, open-ended terms like “reasonable,” “appropriate,” “feasible,” or
“practicable,” than when agencies are interpreting a specific statutory term or
phrase. 384 If he applies that approach in a case examining the meaning of “waters
of the United States,” one would assume that the agencies’ interpretation of that
phrase would be an interpretation of a specific statutory term or phrase, to which
little deference should be accorded. 385 While there are indications, therefore, that
neither Justice Gorsuch nor Justice Kavanaugh would be likely uphold the
agencies’ Step Two rule under Chevron, that by no means suggests that they
would invalidate the rule, as they could interpret the Clean Water Act on their
own to find support for the agencies’ statutory interpretation. Based on Justice
Gorsuch’s prior criticism of the breadth of the over-reach of federal agencies, 386
it is not difficult to imagine that he could find textual support in the Clean Water
Act for the narrowed definition of “waters of the United States” in the
replacement rule.
Although Justice Kavanaugh would likely claim that the scope of federal
jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” is a straightforward statutory
interpretation question, it is not inconceivable that his statutory analysis could
be influenced by his views on federalism and property rights. At this point, it is
difficult to fully discern Kavanaugh’s views on federalism, but he is a frequent

383. See Walker, supra note 382. Walker noted that Kavanaugh suggested, in a lecture in 2018,
that while some judges might only find that a statute is clear if they are ninety percent certain that
the statute has a specific meaning, he probably applies “something approaching a 65/35 rule or
60/40 rule,” meaning that he could find that the statute is clear, so no deference to the agency
interpretation is due, if he is 60–65 percent certain that the statute has a specific meaning (using the
normal tools of statutory interpretation). Id. Justice Kavanaugh fears that judges may be swayed by
policy considerations in determining whether a statute is ambiguous, such that deference to
agencies is required, so he prefers to avoid finding ambiguity at Step One in light of the lack of a
“neutral method to evaluate whether a text is clear of ambiguous.” See Young, supra note 381, at
27 (citing Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2139
(2016)).
384. See Kavanaugh, supra note 383, at 2153–54. See also Walker, supra note 382.
385. Professor Christopher Walker also suggests that Justice Kavanaugh has “expressed a
strong version of the major questions doctrine” and would be likely to join Chief Justice Roberts’
call “for a narrower, more context-specific Chevron.” See Walker, supra note 382. Although the
hyperbole surrounding the “expansion” of Clean Water Act jurisdiction under the 2015 rule might
be used to frame that rule as implicating a “major question,” see Dave Owen, Myths, Realities and
the Clean Water Rule Controversy, CPR BLOG (Mar. 6, 2017), www.progressivereform.org/CPR
Blog.cfm?idBlog=DD010B48-A4C0-DC67-13FC0F22E6E0C020 [https://perma.cc/732C-H5R3].
EPA and the Corps would likely argue that the rollback of jurisdiction in the Step Two rule was
not a “major question,” so the agencies’ rule should not be exempt from Chevron on that ground.
386. See, e.g., Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149–1158.
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critic of federal regulation 387 and the American Legislative Exchange Council 388
and some commentators have suggested that he is a strong supporter of states’
rights. 389 It is similarly difficult to determine Justice Kavanaugh’s views on
property rights, 390 but the Property Rights Alliance 391 and some commentators
have suggested that he is a strong supporter of property rights. 392 If Kavanaugh
proves to be a champion of states’ rights and/or property rights, it is likely that
he could be persuaded that Section 101(b) of the Clean Water Act should be read
to narrow the agencies’ jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” as they
assert in the replacement rule.
However, even if Justice Kavanaugh were to agree with the statutory
interpretation advocated by the agencies in the replacement rule, he could only
vote to uphold their change in interpretation if he concluded that they rationally
explained their change in the legal and factual basis for the 2015 rule. Professor
Christopher Walker predicts that Justice Kavanaugh will “put a tighter leash on
the regulatory state,” whether agencies are regulating or de-regulating. 393 He,
and others, argue that Justice Kavanaugh’s Circuit Court opinions demonstrate
that he takes the State Farm hard look arbitrary and capricious analysis very
seriously and requires agencies to fully justify their changes in regulatory
approaches. 394 If those predictions are correct, it will be very difficult for Justice
387. See Politico Staff, Brett Kavanaugh’s Track Record, POLITICO (July 9, 2018),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/07/09/brett-kavanaugh-track-record-675294 [https://perma.
cc/4VXW-CMVB]; Jonathan H. Adler, Will Kavanaugh Curb Sloppy White House Deregulation?,
N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/brett-kavanaugh-su
preme-court-administrative-state.html [https://perma.cc/2SWV-UHN8].
388. See Graham Vyse, What Brett Kavanaugh Means for States, GOVERNING (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/gov-kavanaugh-states-confirmation-hearing-jus
tice.html [https://perma.cc/A8N7-VYZ3].
389. See Elaine S. Povich & Alayna Alvarez, What Trump’s Pick for Supreme Court Could
Mean for States’ Rights, PEW: STATELINE (July 11, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/researchand-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/07/11/what-trumps-pick-for-supreme-court-could-mean-forstates-rights [https://perma.cc/ZP4V-RFVA].
390. See Andrew Nolan & Caitlin Devereaux Lewis, Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh: His
Jurisprudence and Potential Impact on the Supreme Court (R45293), CONG. RES. SERV. (Aug. 21,
2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45293.pdf [https://perma.cc/59E5-XJNB].
391. See Brogan Feeley, Brett Kavanaugh and Property Rights, PROP. RTS. ALLIANCE (July
17, 2018), https://www.propertyrightsalliance.org/news/brett-kavanaugh-and-property-rights/
[https://perma.cc/PJH7-BTVT].
392. See, e.g., Dick Patten, Brett Kavanaugh Will Be Very Good For Property Rights, WASH.
EXAMINER (Sept. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/brett-kava
naugh-will-be-very-good-for-property-rights [https://perma.cc/5FYK-87GB]; Post Opinions Staff,
What Does Kavanaugh’s Paper Trail Say? Let’s Ask the Experts, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-does-kavanaughs-paper-trail-say-lets-ask-theexperts/2018/08/31/beffd014-ad33-11e8-a8d7-0f63ab8b1370_story.html [https://perma.cc/GR63
7L5R].
393. See Walker, supra note 382.
394. Id. See also Young, supra note 381, at 25–26; Adler, supra note 387.
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Kavanaugh to vote to uphold the agencies replacement rule, due to their lack of
any explanation for their abrupt changes from the 2015 rule other than politics.
As noted earlier, though, it could be several years before challenges to one of
the agencies’ WOTUS rules returns to the Court and there could be additional
changes to the membership of the Court by then. One thing is clear, though.
Unless Congress amends the Clean Water Act, which is unlikely, none of the
agencies’ WOTUS rulemakings are likely to provide clarity, consistency, or
certainty to the regulated community and the public until the Supreme Court reenters the fray. 395

395. The EPA and Corps finalized their “Step 2” rule while this Article was going to press.
Therefore, this Article does not address the changes made by the agencies between the proposed
and final rulemaking.
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